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Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific 
Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs 
in Rule of Reason Analysis 
Alan J. Meese* 
This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable 
competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a 
subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between 
“technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction 
costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase, 
while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from 
perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies 
relationship-specific investments. 
Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction 
costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the trade-off 
model. However, this same methodology is poorly suited for analyzing restraints that 
may reduce non-technological transaction costs. In particular, the model treats non-
restraint price and output as a “competitive” baseline against which to measure a 
restraint’s impact. As a result, tribunals applying the trade-off model may misinterpret 
benefits of such restraints, such as increased investment and resulting higher prices, as 
exercises of market power. Given the baselines that courts use, a test focused on price or 
output will condemn many restraints that enhance welfare. 
Several considerations explain courts’ failure to incorporate the lessons of transaction 
cost economics (“TCE”) when analyzing contracts that may reduce non-technological 
transaction costs. For one thing, the trade-off paradigm has shed light on important 
antitrust problems. Practitioners of a successful paradigm do not readily abandon it. 
Moreover, Coase’s seminal work on TCE focused exclusively on technological 
transaction costs analogous to ordinary production costs easily recognized within the 
trade-off paradigm. Furthermore, proponents of TCE actually embraced and refined the 
trade-off model for analyzing mergers producing technological efficiencies. Finally, lower 
courts have modified aspects of the modern rule of reason test, staving off anomalies that 
can undermine a paradigm’s support. 
Courts should accordingly “reframe” their analysis, selecting a different baseline against 
which to measure the impact of restraints that may reduce non-technological transaction 
costs. That is, tribunals should ask whether the restraint produces higher prices (or lower 
output) compared to the prices or output that would obtain if the defendants made 
specific investments without a safeguard against opportunism. Such an approach would 
hold constant the other variables that influence price and output, thereby isolating the 
impact of the restraint simpliciter on market power and/or transaction costs. 
 
 * Ball Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. J.D., The University of Chicago Law 
School; A.B., The College of William & Mary. The William & Mary School of Law provided a summer 
research grant that supported this project. 
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“No answer is what the wrong question begets.” So said 
constitutional theorist Alex Bickel, speaking of a particular brand of 
constitutional originalism.1 Antitrust lawyers must be wary of borrowing 
ideas from constitutional sources: Such borrowing has, in the past, 
disserved consumers and the rest of society, leading courts to abjure 
consumer welfare in pursuit of values not properly cognizable under the 
Sherman Act’s rule of reason.2 Still, there is a sense in which Bickel’s 
admonition applies with greater force to courts and enforcement agencies 
 
 1. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics 103 (1962). 
 2. Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 209-10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006 & Supp. 
III 2009)). Compare United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972) (banning reasonable 
ancillary restraints because they interfered with the “freedom” of traders to sell wherever they 
pleased), and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 374 (1933), with Nat’l Soc’y of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (explaining that the rule of reason is concerned 
only with economic impact of restraints), Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) 
(same), and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) (holding that the Sherman 
Act bans contracts producing monopoly or its consequences, that is, higher prices, reduced output or 
lower quality). 
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evaluating restraints on rivalry under the rule of reason. Here, the wrong 
question may do more than provide “no” answer. Instead, the wrong 
question may provide the wrong answer, leading courts and enforcement 
agencies to condemn, as harmful, restraints that actually enhance the 
welfare of consumers and the rest of society. 
Under current law, some restraints are unlawful per se, because they 
reduce rivalry without offsetting benefits.3 Still, most restraints on rivalry 
nonetheless avoid per se condemnation, often because they may 
plausibly reduce “transaction costs”—that is, the costs parties would 
otherwise incur by relying upon an unbridled market.4 Courts analyze 
such restraints under the rule of reason, inquiring directly into their 
impact on consumers and the rest of society.5 First identified by Ronald 
Coase in 1937, such costs can take many forms, and this Article proposes 
a simple but powerful taxonomy of them. In the first category are 
“technological transaction costs,” the sort of garden variety bargaining 
and information costs that generally precede a transaction, which Coase 
emphasized in his seminal work on the subject.6 In the second category 
are what this Article calls “non-technological transaction costs,” 
particularly the risk of opportunism, that postdate relationship-specific 
investments that enhance product differentiation. Coase’s early work 
sparked a revolution in how economists understand and interpret non-
standard contracts, with the result that agreements that may reduce 
either form of transaction cost avoid immediate condemnation and are 
scrutinized under the rule of reason.7 
This Article contends that, despite these significant advances in 
economic theory, courts and agencies are asking—or at least purport to 
be asking—“the wrong question” when conducting rule of reason 
analysis of restraints that may overcome certain forms of transaction 
costs. Because of administrative costs, courts cannot observe directly the 
impact of a restraint on social welfare, but must instead seek to discern 
that impact by relying upon various shortcuts that conserve these 
administrative costs. While current standards will produce accurate 
analysis of restraints that defendants claim reduce technological 
transaction costs, they can falsely condemn restraints that avoid per se 
condemnation because they may reduce non-technological transaction 
costs. In particular, courts and agencies place undue emphasis upon a 
restraint’s supposed impact on the “price” (and output) of a defendant’s 
product, an impact courts and agencies purport to ascertain in various 
ways. This contention naturally raises the question why, more than 
 
 3. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 87–94 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See infra notes 274–81 and accompanying text. 
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seventy years after Coase’s revolutionary insight, courts and leading 
scholars have articulated standards that properly evaluate some 
restraints that reduce transaction costs, but are biased against others. The 
Article finds the answer in price theory’s perfect competition and 
workable competition models of industrial organization, models that 
began to influence antitrust doctrine in the mid-twentieth century, 
particularly at the behest of the so-called “Harvard School” of antitrust 
analysis.8 The workable competition model, in particular, posited a 
comparison of a restraint’s market power effects, on the one hand, and 
any resulting technological efficiencies, on the other, a comparison that 
Oliver Williamson later formalized in his famous “partial equilibrium 
trade-off model” in 1968.9 Application of this model and associated 
assumptions led to the so-called “inhospitality tradition” of antitrust law, 
whereby courts and the enforcement agencies condemned most non-
standard agreements.10 
Despite the rise of transaction cost economics, this trade-off model 
still acts as a Kuhnian paradigm guiding the solution to many antitrust 
problems, including the analysis of horizontal mergers and conduct by 
monopolists, each of which may simultaneously enhance market power 
and produce technological efficiencies such as economies of scale. 
Application of this model, in turn, rests upon the identification of a pre-
restraint baseline of price, output, and quality, against which to compare 
the impact of a restraint or transaction. In the rule of reason context, the 
trade-off model, which assumes away externalities, transaction costs, 
specific investments, production differentiation, and changes in market 
demand, influences the “baseline” of price and output that courts employ 
when attempting to discern the impact of a restraint.11 Thus, courts and 
agencies treat the non-restraint baseline of price and/or output—often 
“discerned” via a thought experiment—as a workably competitive 
equilibrium, and thus a valid point of comparison with the post-restraint 
price or output.12 Moreover, the model only recognizes efficiencies that 
tend to reduce the price of the defendant’s product compared to the pre-
restraint baseline.13 Given these assumptions, a restraint that appears to 
result in higher prices compared to the non-restraint baseline necessarily 
reflects an exercise of market power, to the detriment of consumers and 
the rest of society. 
Reliance upon the partial equilibrium trade-off model and its 
limiting assumptions is not surprising. Both the Harvard and Chicago 
 
 8. See infra notes 31–86 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 55–57, 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 113–14, 119–21 and accompanying text. 
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Schools of antitrust analysis have expressly or implicitly invoked this 
paradigm as a proper vehicle for analyzing antitrust problems.14 The 
Harvard School, in particular, has for decades premised its antitrust 
policy upon an effort to implement the prescriptions of workable 
competition and has advocated a rule of reason test reflecting the 
dictates of the partial equilibrium paradigm.15 The Supreme Court, in 
turn, has cited Harvard pronouncements when articulating key facets of 
the rule of reason test,16 leaving the agencies and lower courts with little 
apparent choice but to follow suit, though some lower courts have in fact 
departed from Supreme Court doctrine.17 While the Harvard School has 
internalized important elements of transaction cost economics (“TCE”), 
particularly when advocating narrower per se rules, it has stubbornly 
clung to the trade-off model—which produces useful results in other 
contexts—when analyzing restraints that may reduce transaction costs 
under the rule of reason. The courts and agencies have followed 
Harvard’s teachings in this respect.18 
Examination of “price” (or output) to evaluate a restraint’s impact 
would seem to make sense, given the Sherman Act’s singular focus on 
“consumer welfare.” Indeed, courts and scholars have argued that such a 
standard economizes on the cost of identifying restraints that exercise 
market power to the detriment of consumers.19 For instance, proponents 
of this view contend that if a restraint does or would result in higher 
prices or lower output, it is presumptively an exercise of market power.20 
Moreover, if a restraint does, in fact, reduce transaction costs, basic 
economics informed by the perfect competition model would seem to 
predict that such a reduction in costs would manifest itself in lower 
prices, other things being equal. Hence, reliance upon this standard 
would seem to economize on the costs of determining whether the 
benefits of a restraint counteract its purported harms. 
Closer analysis suggests that the actual impact of such restraints is 
more complicated than basic economics grounded in price theory and the 
workable competition model would suggest. Certainly some reductions 
in transaction costs resulting from complete or partial integration will 
manifest themselves as reduced prices when compared to the partial 
equilibrium model’s non-restraint baseline. Indeed, bargaining and 
information costs, the original “transaction costs” that Ronald Coase 
identified in 1937, are relatively slight departures from perfect 
 
 14. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 119–31 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 101, 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 99–127 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. 
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competition and are analogous, if not identical, to the sort of 
technological production costs recognized by the perfect and workable 
competition models. Thus, the dominant paradigm for analyzing trade 
restraints, developed within the confines of the workable competition 
model, readily incorporates Coase’s original insight that vertical 
integration can reduce technological transaction costs, even though the 
workable competition model did not recognize such costs.21 When a 
restraint purportedly reduces these costs without impacting other 
economic variables, the current method for analyzing restraints, 
influenced by the partial equilibrium trade-off model, produces correct 
results. Indeed, the technological nature of the transaction costs that 
Coase identified likely explains why the partial equilibrium paradigm 
and the resulting hostility toward non-standard contracts survived 
Coase’s 1937 insight completely unscathed. Paradigms and their 
practitioners are stubborn, and the partial equilibrium paradigm is no 
exception. Because this paradigm incorporated technological transaction 
costs so readily, even economists who embraced Coase’s analysis would 
have had no reason to question the broad application of the trade-off 
model until other scholars rediscovered Coase’s insight and identified 
non-technological transaction costs that such agreements could 
eliminate. 
Still, courts and the enforcement agencies err when they employ the 
partial equilibrium paradigm to examine restraints that may reduce non-
technological costs. While the partial equilibrium model recognizes 
technological efficiencies, it also assumes constant consumer demand and 
the absence of transaction costs and externalities. Many non-standard 
contracts, however, lower costs by reducing the risk of opportunism that 
arises because of relationship-specific investments and resulting product 
differentiation. Such opportunism is an externality, made possible by 
imperfect institutional arrangements such as poorly-specified property 
rights and other conditions that contravene the workable competition 
model from which courts derive their price and output baselines when 
conducting rule of reason analysis. Because the partial equilibrium 
model’s baseline does not incorporate such externalities or shifts in 
demand, reliance on the trade-off model to evaluate restraints that may 
reduce non-technological transaction costs can produce incorrect results. 
Simply put, reductions in non-technological transaction costs bear no 
similarity to technological efficiencies and can manifest themselves as 
prices that are higher than those that defendants would charge but for 
the restraint, at least as courts and agencies currently frame their analysis 
and measure the impact of such restraints. By facilitating the 
differentiation or promotion of a product, these restraints can enhance 
 
 21. See infra notes 211–15. 
Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:18 PM 
December 2010]   REFRAMING ANTITRUST 463 
the demand for the item, as well as the cost of producing and promoting 
it, resulting in a price that is higher than the defendant would charge 
without the restraint and accompanying investments. 
To be sure, removal of the restraint simpliciter could result in 
reduced prices compared to those that postdate the investments the 
restraint accompanies, at least in the short run, but this reduction would 
reflect opportunistic exploitation of specific investments by the party no 
longer bound by the restraint that induced such investments in the first 
place. Such exploitation and the resulting price and output do not reflect 
a stable economic equilibrium, as it will lead defendants to cease 
investing in the very activities that created the value being exploited, 
thereby reducing the quality and promotion of the defendant’s product. 
Thus, the prices resulting from a hypothetical removal of the restraint 
reflect opportunistic behavior and resulting externality, contrary to the 
partial equilibrium model’s assumption of no externality. They are 
economic illusions and do not reflect profitable economic activity, with 
the result that the partial equilibrium model cannot provide a useful 
vehicle for evaluating such restraints without some modifications. 
The rule of reason’s bias against restraints that reduce certain types 
of transaction costs is ironic, given current law’s reliance upon the 
propensity to reduce such costs as a rationale for sparing certain 
restraints from per se condemnation.22 Since the 1960s, various scholars 
have argued that numerous restraints deemed harmful by the workable 
competition model are actually beneficial efforts to reduce the costs of 
relying upon the market, that is, transacting, to conduct economic 
activity.23 While courts and enforcement agencies properly incorporate 
these revolutionary insights when determining whether a restraint is 
unlawful per se, they sometimes ask the wrong question when conducting 
rule of reason analysis of restraints that avoid per se condemnation, 
giving undue focus to the purported impact that such restraints have 
upon the price that defendants charge for their products and/or the 
output they produce.24 
The realization that improper framing distorts the outcome of rule 
of reason analysis under current standards suggests that courts should 
reframe their analysis so as to incorporate the insights of TCE. In 
particular, courts should employ a different baseline when determining 
whether a restraint results in higher prices or reduced output. That is, 
courts should ask whether prices produced by the restraint are higher, or 
output lower, than the prices, or output, that would result if the 
defendants enter the venture and made specific investments without 
 
 22. See infra notes 87–94, 275–81 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 244–56 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 305–12 and accompanying text. 
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adopting the challenged restraint. If the restraint would produce higher 
prices, or reduced output, compared to this baseline, then a court or 
agency could properly conclude that the market power effects of the 
restraint overcome any efficiencies. However, courts and agencies will 
rarely be able to observe this baseline—which differs markedly from the 
sort of rivalry and equilibrium that existed before the restraint—directly, 
since firms will only rarely enter a transaction or venture without 
adopting a restraint that counteracts opportunism. As a result, courts and 
agencies examining a challenged restraint will have to ascertain the costs 
and benefits of such restraints directly, thereby determining whether the 
restraint produces more harm than good when compared to a 
hypothetical world in which the defendants do not adopt the restraint. 
Part I of this Article reviews antitrust law’s evolving treatment of 
non-standard contracts that often reduce transaction costs. This Part 
reviews the inhospitality tradition of antitrust, whereby courts and 
agencies, influenced by the models of perfect and workable competition, 
condemned various non-standard contracts as unlawful per se, or nearly 
so. Such hostility, it is shown, rested upon an application of the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model, including the assumption that efficiencies 
were technological in nature and that such restraints could not produce 
technological efficiencies. This Part then explains how courts and 
agencies abandoned various per se rules, after concluding that such 
restraints can reduce transaction costs. This Part also details the 
standards that courts and agencies now employ when analyzing such 
restraints under the rule of reason. Both courts and agencies, it is shown, 
focus heavily on the impact that a restraint purportedly has on a 
defendant’s price or output. In particular, courts now employ, at the 
behest of the Harvard School, various means of identifying a non-
restraint equilibrium price and output and presume unlawful any 
restraint that appears to result in prices above—or output below—this 
purported equilibrium. While these standards are relatively 
uncontroversial, they seem internally incoherent, produce anomalous 
results, and are sometimes ignored by lower courts. 
Part II examines the rise of “transaction cost economics,” the 
economic framework that undermined the inhospitality tradition and led 
to the reversal of various rules condemning certain non-standard 
contracts. The Part begins by examining Ronald Coase’s 1937 claim that 
the firm, a particular non-standard contract, arises to minimize the 
“transaction costs” that would beset continuous market contracting 
between unaffiliated individuals in the real world.25 This Part also 
articulates two categories of transaction costs that non-standard contracts 
may reduce. So-called “technological transaction costs,” which Coase 
 
 25. See infra notes 176–95 and accompanying text. 
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emphasized, involve the bargaining and information costs ordinarily 
associated with the term in the law and economics literature. These costs 
are closely analogous to the production costs normally recognized within 
the perfect and workable competition models. By contrast, so-called 
“non-technological transaction costs” result from numerous departures 
from perfect competition, including product differentiation and 
departures from both perfect and workable competition, namely 
relationship-specific investments, opportunism, and the passage of time. 
Moreover, departures from perfect competition that give rise to non-
technological transaction costs often reflect improvements over the 
allocation of resources and resulting social welfare that atomistic rivalry 
would produce in the “real world.” While most law and economics 
scholars have focused on the first type of transaction costs,26 scholars 
interested in antitrust problems have generally focused on the second.27 
Part III examines the standards currently governing rule of reason 
analysis of restraints that reduce transaction costs. These standards, 
based as they are on the partial equilibrium paradigm, properly evaluate 
restraints that reduce technological transaction costs, which are closely 
analogous to the sort of technological efficiencies recognized by the 
workable competition model. In such cases, the stubbornness of the 
partial equilibrium paradigm has served antitrust law well. However, 
these same standards are not up to the task of evaluating restraints that 
reduce non-technological transaction costs. In particular, a singular focus 
on the price and/or output supposedly produced by a restraint can yield 
incorrect results, particularly in light of the baselines that courts employ 
when conducting this analysis. This Part ends by offering some possible 
explanations for the law’s stubborn failure to adjust partial equilibrium 
analysis to account for TCE’s identification of non-technological 
transaction costs. As it turns out, several factors, including Coase’s focus 
on technological transaction costs, have combined to prevent the 
emergence of the sort of crisis that leads scientists to reexamine 
paradigms that have served their profession well. Part IV explains how 
courts and agencies should reframe rule of reason analysis in light of the 
insights offered in Part III. 
I.  Antitrust’s Treatment of Non-Standard Contracts 
Antitrust law’s treatment of non-standard contracts—whether 
complete or partial integration—has evolved alongside economic theory 
over the last sixty years. This Part examines that evolution and lays the 
groundwork for explication of the continuing influence of various 
economic theories on antitrust doctrine governing these agreements. 
 
 26. See sources cited infra note 191. 
 27. See infra notes 239–56 and accompanying text. 
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Price theory and its workable competition model, it is shown, exercised 
significant influence over antitrust doctrine, influence that was mediated 
by the stubborn partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm. In particular, 
courts condemned numerous restraints as unlawful per se, or nearly so, 
because they reduced rivalry between the parties without producing any 
apparent offsetting benefits. While the Supreme Court has reversed 
many of the more extreme manifestations of this “inhospitality 
tradition,” current standards governing rule of reason analysis of such 
agreements nonetheless seem to produce anomalous results. At the same 
time, some lower courts have modified such standards, seemingly 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, so as to avoid condemning 
agreements that apparently produce significant benefits. 
A. “Perfect Competition,” “Workable Competition,” and the 
Inhospitality Tradition 
The Sherman Act’s28 rule of reason requires courts and agencies to 
determine whether a challenged agreement “restrains trade” 
unreasonably by producing the consequences of monopoly power: 
reduced output, above-cost pricing, and/or reduced quality.29 Courts and 
agencies have naturally turned to economic theory to guide them in 
discerning the impact of challenged restraints.30 For several decades of 
the twentieth century, neoclassical price theory was the dominant 
economic framework relevant to industrial organization and antitrust 
policy.31 Indeed, during this period, industrial organization was little 
 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 29. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911); id. at 61 (defining 
“restraint of trade” as “undue restraint of the course of trade,” bringing about monopoly, or 
“produc[ing] the same result as monopoly”); id. at 57 (“[At common law] contracts or acts 
which . . . were thought to unduly diminish competition and hence to enhance prices—in other words, 
to monopolize—came . . . to be spoken of and treated as . . . being in restraint of trade.”); id. at 52 
(listing “evils” of monopoly as: (1) the power to fix prices, (2) the power to limit output, and 
(3) reduced quality of the monopolized product); id. (characterizing “power arbitrarily to enhance 
prices” as one of “the wrongs arising from monopoly”); see also Robert H. Bork, Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775, 802–05, 831–32 (1965); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition 
and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77, 83–89. 
 30. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law: 1836–1937, at 268 (1991) (“One of 
the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ 
to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s. At most, this ‘revolution’ in antitrust policy represented a 
change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its 
inception.”); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 
N.C. L. Rev. 219, 226 (1995) (“In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed 
models to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement.”). 
 31. Exemplars of the price-theoretic approach to industrial organization include: Joe S. Bain, 
Industrial Organization (1959); Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E. Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law 
and Economics of Antitrust Policy (1954); Carl Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: 
An Economic and Legal Analysis (1959); John Perry Miller, Unfair Competition: A Study in 
Criteria for the Control of Trade Practices (1941); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and 
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more than “applied price theory.”32 Price theory, which sought to explain 
the “performance of business firms in relation to the selling markets for 
the goods they produce,”33 rested upon the foundational model of perfect 
competition.34 This model imagined a world of continuous, unconstrained 
rivalry between innumerable firms resulting in a “competitive” price and 
“competitive” output.35 If replicated in all industries, such unbridled 
rivalry would produce an instantaneous equilibrium and optimal 
allocation of resources, maximizing the value of society’s output in light 
of its endowment of labor, capital, and other inputs.36 
To be sure, economists recognized that the real world did not always 
replicate perfect competition’s various assumptions.37 Some departures 
from these assumptions were the result of imperfect legal arrangements 
that resulted in a poor specification of property rights.38 In such cases, 
society could enhance welfare by altering legal institutions to eliminate 
these imperfections.39 In other instances, however, such departures were 
exogenous to legal rules and would arise even in a perfect legal system. 
Focusing on these latter departures, economists of the era recognized 
 
Economics, 47 Yale L.J. 34 (1937). 
 32. See R. H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in The Firm, the Market, 
and the Law 59–64 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Industrial Organization] (arguing that, as of 1972, 
industrial organization consisted simply of applied price theory). Indeed, after reviewing two of the 
period’s leading industrial organization texts, Professor Coase concluded that “essentially, both 
[authors] consider the subject of industrial organization as applied price-theory.” Id. at 60; see also 
Bain, supra note 31, at 25–27 (describing price theory as a foundation of industrial organization); 
Richard Caves, American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance 14 (Otto Eckstein ed., 2d 
ed. 1967) (“The subject of ‘industrial organization’ applies the economist’s models of price theory to 
the industries in the world around us.”); George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 1 (1968) 
(portraying industrial organization as “price or resource allocation theory”). 
 33. Bain, supra note 31, at 25–26. 
 34. See generally Frank M. Machovec, Perfect Competition and the Transformation of 
Economics (1995) (tracing the rise of perfect competition model and its influence on microeconomic 
theory); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1957) 
(tracing the evolution of perfect competition model); see also Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 7–8 
(“[T]he rigorous model of the perfectly competitive market is the appropriate starting point of any 
definition [of competition].”). 
 35. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 76–93 (Augustus M. Kelley, 1964) 
(1921) (propounding a detailed articulation of the perfect competition model and the consequences of 
perfect competition); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Competitive Price 21–26 (1942); see also 
infra notes 153–68 and accompanying text (detailing assumptions of the perfect competition model). 
 36. See Knight, supra note 35, at 81–86; Stigler, supra note 35, at 26–31. 
 37. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 35, at 264–90 (introducing the notion of uncertainty and its 
impact upon an otherwise competitive market). 
 38. See A.C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare 172–203 (4th ed. 1962); see also Kaysen & Turner, 
supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (explaining how inequality of private and social costs reflects “inappropriate 
property institutions”). 
 39. See, e.g., Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (contending that divergence between 
private and social costs establishes case for government operation of an industry); Pigou, supra note 
38, at 172–203; Morris A. Copeland, Institutionalism and Welfare Economics, Am. Econ. Rev., Mar. 
1958, at 1, 2–7. 
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that certain additional departures from perfect competition could 
actually enhance society’s welfare.40 For instance, contrary to the 
assumptions of perfect competition, firms might produce heterogeneous 
products, catering to consumers’ preferences for variety. While such 
differentiation could confer modest market power on sellers, the benefits 
of differentiation often outweighed any harm.41 
Moreover, in some industries, technological conditions might 
require firms to reach significant size to achieve economies of scale or 
other technological efficiencies.42 In these circumstances, a departure 
from the model’s assumption of innumerable participants in each 
industry might produce significant efficiencies, even if that departure 
resulted in market power due to oligopoly or even monopoly.43 Where 
realization of efficiencies required market power, scholars argued that 
policy should tolerate such power.44 
 
 40. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 71 n.31 (suggesting that, given some departures from 
perfect competition, other departures might actually enhance welfare). 
 41. Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 31, at 32 (“Product differentiation, for example, is often a means 
of competition that serves the public by providing minimum assurances of quality and by catering to a 
real consumer desire for product improvement or variation.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 117; Alfred 
R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market Practices 88 (1951) (“[Perfect competition] may not 
give desirable results in a world characterized by rapidly changing consumer tastes [and] a strong 
desire for diversity of products . . . .”); F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance 22 (1970) (describing product differentiation as a potentially beneficial departure from 
perfect competition); Frank H. Knight, Demand and Supply and Price, in Second-Year Course in the 
Social Sciences: Syllabus and Selected Readings 193, 218 (Harry D. Gideonse et al. eds., 2d 
prelim. ed. 1933) (explaining that a seller’s “monopoly” over its own brand is constrained by 
competition from other branded goods); Mason, supra note 31, at 47–49 (concluding that economists 
should not oppose all instances of product differentiation despite the resulting market power); see also 
E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1950, at 85, 92 
(“Monopoly elements are built into the economic system and the ideal necessarily involves them. Thus 
wherever there is a demand for diversity of product, pure competition turns out to be not the ideal but 
a departure from it.”). 
 42. See Joe S. Bain, Pricing, Distribution, and Employment: Economics of an Enterprise 
System 112 (rev. ed. 1953) (“In most industries a very small firm is quite inefficient; as the firm 
becomes larger, it tends to become more efficient, reaching a minimum cost per unit of output at some 
particular scale.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 8 (“[Real-world competition] may consist in an endeavor 
to organize and utilize factors more effectively in producing goods and services, this involving a rivalry 
in technological processes as well as in economy in the use and organization of men and materials.”); 
Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition: The Economics of a Fully Employed Economy 331–33 
(1951); Stigler, supra note 35, at 132–42. 
 43. See Bain, supra note 42 (“In most industries, a small firm is quite inefficient . . . .”); id. at 153 
(concluding that monopolized industries often realize economies of scale and may out-produce 
competitive ones); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 5–8; Miller, supra note 31, at 411 (“[I]t would 
not be feasible to pulverize industry sufficiently to approximate pure competition . . . without 
interfering with the attainment of the optimum scale of plant and rate of operation . . . .”); Edward S. 
Mason, Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in Economic Concentration and the 
Monopoly Problem 382, 387 (1957) (“Some power there has to be, both because of inescapable 
limitations to the process of atomization and because power is needed to do the job the American 
public expects of its industrial machine.”). 
 44. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 45 (“[I]n so far as reduction of market power is 
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Given these benefits of exogenously-driven departures from perfect 
competition, price theorists did not view restoring atomistic rivalry of the 
sort imagined by the model as a proper goal of antitrust policy. Instead, 
price theory implied that antitrust law should further what became 
known as “workable competition.”45 Under this approach, conduct 
resulting in a departure from perfect competition, and thus market 
power, was presumptively “anticompetitive” and therefore, harmful 
unless it produced countervailing technological efficiencies or product 
differentiation that offset such harm.46 While more “realistic” than 
perfect competition, workable competition models continued to embrace 
most assumptions of the perfect competition model, including the 
assumption that bargaining costs, information costs, opportunism, and 
externalities are completely absent.47 
The workable competition approach to antitrust found particular 
expression in the so-called “Harvard School” of antitrust policy.48 Indeed, 
beginning in the early 1950s, Harvard maintained an interdisciplinary 
working group charged with “developing a standard of workable 
competition” to guide antitrust regulation.49 In 1959, two participants, 
Donald Turner and Carl Kaysen, produced a definitive text aimed at 
guiding antitrust law toward the policies required by workable 
competition.50 The text argued that market power should render a 
 
incompatible with efficiency and progressiveness, we subordinate the first goal to the second.”); id. at 
113 (arguing that monopoly achieved via economies of scale should be beyond antitrust scrutiny); id. 
at 133 (arguing that merger creating significant efficiencies should pass scrutiny despite enhancement 
of market power); Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 
82 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1217–25 (1969) (arguing that monopoly achieved via economies of scale should 
survive antitrust scrutiny). 
 45. See J. M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, Am. Econ. Rev., June 1940, at 
241, 243 (first articulating the concept of “workable competition” as a guide to antitrust policy). 
 46. See generally Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 Minn. 
L. Rev. 743, 772–93 (2005) (summarizing scholarly literature of the era endorsing this model). 
 47. See, e.g., Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (“[T]he equality of private and social 
costs, especially in the areas relevant to our study, is not a major problem.”); see also Freidrich A. 
Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, in Individualism and Economic Order 92, 94 (1948) (“Most 
[assumptions of the perfect competition model] are equally assumed in the discussion of the various 
‘imperfect’ or ‘monopolistic’ markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic ‘perfections.’”); 
Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in Coasean 
Economics: Law and Economics and the New Institutional Economics 1, 2–3 (Steven G. Medema 
ed., 1997) (noting that pioneers of oligopoly theory invoked various assumptions of perfect 
competition model). Indeed, George Stigler’s pioneering article on the economics of information 
began by noting that “economics” (not “perfect competition”) mostly ignored the question of 
information. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213, 213 (1961). 
 48. See Jacobs, supra note 30, at 227–29 (describing so-called Harvard School of industrial 
organization and antitrust policy during this period). 
 49. Nine Professors Named for Study of Monopoly Problems, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 10, 
1950, at 13 (describing Mason’s launch of his five year study); see also Bain, supra note 31, at x 
(asserting that Mason created the field of industrial organization); Edward Mason, Preface to Kaysen 
& Turner, supra note 31, at xi, xix–xx (1959) (describing origins and workings of the group). 
 50. See generally Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31; Mason, supra note 49, at xix–xx (explaining 
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practice or transaction unlawful absent proof that it would create 
technological efficiencies or other benefits, such as product 
differentiation.51 In the same year, another member of the group, Joe 
Bain, whose work was supported by the same foundation that subsidized 
the Harvard group, produced a definitive text on industrial 
organization.52 While Bain did not write about antitrust policy per se, 
Harvard scholars who did often relied upon his work.53 
The validation of some practices that departed from perfect 
competition and created market power rested upon an implicit balance 
of harms against benefits that assumed the latter predominated.54 In 1968, 
Oliver Williamson would formalize this result at Donald Turner’s behest, 
employing price theory’s partial equilibrium trade-off model to 
demonstrate that a merger to monopoly that enhanced market power 
and produced allocational losses could nonetheless enhance overall 
welfare if it resulted in non-trivial technological efficiencies such as 
economies of scale.55 Williamson embraced various assumptions of the 
workable competition model, including (1) that prices and output before 
a merger were in a state of equilibrium; (2) an absence of externalities; 
(3) unchanged products; (4) unchanged demand; and (5) that efficiencies 
were technological in nature and therefore, other things being equal, 
manifested in the form of lower prices.56 These various assumptions, in 
what Williamson called a “naïve” model, allowed for definitive 
conclusions about the overall impact of two—but only two—
countervailing effects of a transaction, while holding everything else 
constant, in keeping with the general methodology of price theory.57 
 
that this text grew out of Mason’s working group). 
 51. Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 45, 113. 
 52. See Bain, supra note 31, at x (describing support by this foundation for research that informed 
the text and also formed the basis for a different book). 
 53. See Turner, supra note 44, at 1211, 1215. 
 54. See Meese, supra note 46, at 780–83; see also Joe S. Bain, Price Theory 208–09 (1952) 
(explaining how efficiencies resulting from large size could offset harm flowing from market power); 
Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 77–81 (articulating this approach); id. at 128–29 (contending that a 
merger conferring market power could nonetheless enhance welfare on balance by producing “the 
appropriate scale of operations”); George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, Am. Econ. 
Rev., June 1942, at 1, 8–13 (examining the extent to which economies of scale might justify departures 
from perfect competition). 
 55. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, Am. 
Econ. Rev., Mar. 1968, at 18 [hereinafter Williamson, Antitrust Defense]; see also Oliver E. 
Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years, Antitrust, Spring 2003, at 61, 64 
(explaining the origins of this conclusion). 
 56. See Williamson, Antitrust Defense, supra note 55, at 21–24; id. at 22 n.4 (“[S]ocial and private 
costs are assumed to be identical.”). 
 57. See Bain, supra note 54, at 14 (explaining that price theory examines the impact of small 
changes under the assumption that most variables are fixed); Knight, supra note 35, at 79 (explaining 
that perfect competition assumes that all given conditions and factors “remain absolutely 
unchanged”); W. Kip Viscusi, et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 74 (2d ed. 1996) 
(explaining how partial equilibrium tools assume away complexities such as externalities and 
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Williamson’s analysis formalized and legitimated what some 
philosophers of science call a paradigm, to wit, a concrete problem 
solution, akin to a common law precedent, that a given profession 
accepts as the basis for further research, often by analogy.58 This 
paradigm naturally informed merger analysis; merger case law and the 
enforcement guidelines still bear its influence.59 Moreover, numerous 
antitrust scholars subsequently explicitly embraced Williamson’s merger 
trade-off analysis as a paradigm to be applied to various other antitrust 
problems.60 Indeed, Robert Bork, a founder of the Chicago School of 
antitrust analysis, opined that Williamson’s model was properly “used to 
illustrate all antitrust problems.”61 Other scholars continued to employ 
the trade-off analysis implicitly, by invoking the postulates and policy 
prescriptions of the workable competition school and citing Williamson’s 
article and welfare conclusions with approval.62 
 
interactions between industries); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that 
workable competition embraces many of the same limiting assumptions as perfect competition). 
 58. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research, 
in The Essential Tension 225, 225–39 (1977) [hereinafter Kuhn, The Essential Tension] (articulating 
Kuhn’s original, narrower definition); id. at 229 (“[Text]books exhibit concrete problem solutions that 
the profession has come to accept as paradigms, and they then ask the student . . . to solve for himself 
problems very closely related in both method and substance to those through which the textbook or 
accompanying lecture has led him. Nothing could be better calculated to produce ‘mental sets’ or 
Einstellungen.”); id. at 233 (describing basic research in the sciences in the same way); Thomas S. 
Kuhn, Preface to Essential Tension supra, at ix, xvii–xx (articulating this definition and recognizing 
that the definition of the concept was expanded in Scientific Revolutions to refer to the set of values 
and pre-commitments shared by a particular scientific community); Thomas S. Kuhn, Second 
Thoughts on Paradigms, in Essential Tension, supra, at 293, 294–308; 2 Thomas S. Kuhn, 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 23 (2d 
ed. 1970) [hereinafter Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions] (“In a science, on the other hand, a paradigm is 
rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an 
object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions.”); Wolfgang 
Stegmüller, The Structure and Dynamics of Theories 177–80 (1976). 
 59. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 Antitrust L.J. 207 (2003) (describing the 
role of Williamson’s trade-off model in enforcement policy). 
 60. Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 107–10 (Free Press 
1993) (1978) (arguing that Williamson’s trade-off model can be used to illustrate all antitrust 
problems); Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, Am. Econ. Rev., 
May 1969, at 105, 105 (“The emphasis throughout [this article] is on mergers, but much of the 
argument generalizes easily.”); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern 
Industrial Organization 798–99 (2d ed. 1994) (relying upon the Williamson model to illustrate 
efficiency-based antitrust policy); Viscusi et al., supra note 57, at 124–25 (agreeing with Bork that a 
partial equilibrium “diagram can be used to illustrate all antitrust problems”); Thomas C. Arthur, The 
Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 15–18 
(1994) (invoking Williamson’s model to illustrate the trade-off between market power and efficiencies 
when analyzing trade restraints); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand “Cartels” Under GTE Sylvania, 
30 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (1982) (employing the model to illustrate a “consumer welfare” standard 
applicable to all antitrust problems). 
 61. See Bork, supra note 60, at 108. 
 62. See, e.g., 2 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
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Non-standard contracts, such as tying, exclusive dealing, exclusive 
territories, or complete vertical integration, did not fare well within 
either the workable competition model or the trade-off paradigm that 
informed it. Such agreements offended two postulates of perfect 
competition. First, these contracts limited rivalry between the parties to 
them, or between these parties and third parties.63 Second, given the 
nature of contract—to restrain—such agreements interfered with the 
movement of resources from one user to the other.64 Thus, such 
agreements contravened perfect competition’s assumed absence of 
“obstacles to the making, execution, and changing of plans at will” and 
“‘perfect mobility’ in all economic adjustments, with no cost involved in 
movements or changes.”65 
These departures from perfect competition did not, according to 
price theorists, produce offsetting benefits. Such agreements interfered 
with the discretion of trading partners before firms took title to inputs, or 
after title to output passed to consumers. Thus, such agreements could 
not create technological efficiencies such as economies of scale, which by 
their nature arose within a firm, in connection with the manufacturing 
process.66 For the same reason, such agreements could not alter or 
enhance the quality of the products they governed. Moreover, scholars of 
the era habitually assumed a well-functioning legal system, including 
well-defined property rights that minimized the prospect that private 
 
Antitrust Principles and Their Application, ¶ 408a, at 292 n.1 (1978) (invoking Williamson’s 
conclusions in support of tolerance for concentration and resulting scale economies); Timothy J. 
Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381 (1980) 
(relying upon Williamson’s conclusion to justify an efficiency defense in the merger context). 
 63. Cf. Knight, supra note 35, at 77–78 (noting that perfect competition requires absence of 
cooperation between individuals that are potential rivals); Stigler, supra note 34, at 14 (“[I]t seems 
essential to assume the absence of collusion as a supplement to the presence of large numbers.”). 
 64. Cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“To bind, to restrain is of 
[the] very essence [of contracts].”). 
 65. Knight, supra note 35, at 77–78; see also Stigler, supra note 35, at 21 (explaining that perfect 
competition assumes that “markets are free from special institutional restraints” and that “prices and 
the mobility of resources are not restricted”). 
 66. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism 370–71 (1985) (explaining 
how price theory treated efficiencies as technological in nature and thus as arising “within” the firm). 
Complete vertical integration constituted a partial exception to the generalizations offered here, since 
such integration could conceivably create technological efficiencies. See Bain, supra note 31, at 356–57 
(describing possible technological benefits of vertical integration); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 
128–29 (explaining that merger can alter the extent of vertical integration to account for technological 
changes). Still, scholars assumed that most such integration enhanced market power. See Bain, supra 
note 31, at 357–58 (“[T]here is a good deal of vertical integration which, although not actually 
uneconomical, is also not justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is apparently true in particular 
of the integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms, where in most cases the rational of 
the integration is most evidently the increase of the market power of the firms involved rather than a 
reduction in cost.”); Stigler, supra note 54, at 22 (“Such economies are historical: technological 
progress merely leads to a redefinition of the scope of the production process. But it is arguable that 
most of the important advantages of vertical integration partake of a monopolistic nature.”). 
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costs could diverge from social costs.67 This legal framework was 
exogenous to the economic market; economic actors took it as a given 
and could not change it, just as they took for granted the sort of scientific 
and engineering considerations that determined the shape of production 
functions, the mathematical relationships between inputs and outputs.68 
Scholars also assumed, somewhat curiously, that parties did not behave 
in an opportunistic fashion, thereby precluding recognition that such 
restraints could overcome such opportunism.69 Because such restraints 
restricted rivalry, and interfered with the mobility of resources while 
producing no corresponding technological benefits, economists naturally 
inferred that they reflected an exercise of market power to the detriment 
of consumers and the rest of society.70 There were, moreover, no apparent 
efficiencies that might offset these harms. Given these assumptions, 
application of the trade-off paradigm easily required condemnation of 
such agreements. 
For over three decades, price theory and its workable competition 
model informed antitrust policy, giving rise to the “inhospitality tradition” 
of antitrust.71 During this era, courts found numerous practices 
unreasonable per se, reasoning that such practices always, or almost 
always, were anticompetitive and always, or almost always, lacked 
redeeming virtues.72 Price-fixing, whether horizontal or vertical, maximum 
 
 67. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (“[T]he equality of private and social costs, 
especially in the areas relevant to our study, is not a major problem.”); Pigou, supra note 38, at 127–30 
(explaining that a competitive economic system depends upon well-functioning property and contract 
rights). 
 68. See Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the Ghost of Perfect 
Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 21, 69–70 (2005) (explaining how the 
perfect competition model assumed fixed property rights and other background rules of law that 
parties could not change by contract); see also infra note 165 and accompanying text (collecting 
authorities for the proposition that the shape of production functions depends upon exogenous 
scientific and engineering considerations). 
 69. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested 
Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 1993, at 83, 84 (1993) 
(contending that price theory and perfect competition rested upon an assumption that market actors 
behaved as “Victorian gentlemen”); Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect Competition and 
the Creativity of the Market, 39 J. Econ. Literature 479, 490–91 (2001) (detailing the tendency of some 
devotees of perfect competition to assume away the possibility of opportunism by fiat). 
 70. See Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing that behavior different from that predicted 
by the perfect competition model reflects the exercise of market power). 
 71. See Meese, supra note 29, at 124–34 (detailing the influence of price theory on antitrust 
doctrine during this period and the resulting inhospitality tradition). The phrase “inhospitality 
tradition” was coined by Donald Turner, a Harvard economist and lawyer who headed the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice during the Johnson Administration. Donald F. Turner, Some 
Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. St. B. Ass’n Antitrust L. Symp. 1, 1–2. Turner “approach[ed] 
territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in 
the tradition of antitrust law.” Id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 30, at 227–29 (describing the Harvard 
School of antitrust policy). 
 72. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958) (articulating and applying 
this test to tying agreements). 
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or minimum, failed this test, regardless of defendants’ position in the 
marketplace.73 Other horizontal limitations on rivalry were unlawful per se, 
even when ancillary to legitimate ventures.74 Tying contracts and exclusive 
dealing fared slightly better. Tying was “only” unlawful per se when the 
seller of the tying product possessed “economic power,” which courts 
found in any departure from perfect competition.75 Exclusive dealing 
contracts were unlawful whenever they “foreclosed” a non-trivial share of 
the relevant market, regardless of whether they created any offsetting 
benefits.76 The Federal Trade Commission went even further, with the 
blessing of the Supreme Court, banning as “unfair trade practices” 
exclusive dealing agreements that foreclosed one percent of the market.77 
Finally, complete vertical integration by merger was unlawful whenever 
the transaction “foreclosed” rivals from a non-trivial portion of the 
market.78 Such transactions, it was said, created a “clog on competition,” 
with competition defined as moment-by-moment rivalry.79 
At the same time, so-called unilateral conduct was almost always 
lawful per se.80 Such behavior included charging a high price, realizing 
economies of scale, devising new products, as well as advertising and 
promoting those products.81 Moreover, courts expressly held that 
successful product differentiation did not violate Sherman Act § 2,82 
despite any resulting market power.83 Nearly all of these practices could 
injure rivals and perhaps drive them from the market, to the detriment of 
consumers in some cases. Nonetheless, courts treated such conduct as 
“competition on the merits,” beyond scrutiny under either § 1 or § 2 of 
 
 73. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152–53 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram 
& Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). 
 74. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606–13 (1972) (banning contractually-
imposed exclusive territories ancillary to valid venture); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357–
58 (1967) (same). 
 75. See N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6; see also Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503–
04 (1969) (finding that the existence of tying contracts creates a presumption that agreements are 
imposed via market power); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (possession of 
copyright creates presumption of economic power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that ownership of attractive trademarks established “economic power”). 
 76. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949) (holding exclusive 
dealing contracts necessarily “substantially lessen[ed] competition” where manufacturer bound 6.7% 
of region’s dealers); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d, 
343 U.S. 922 (1952) (finding exclusive dealing contract that bound three percent of a region’s dealers 
unlawful). 
 77. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (“[Such agreements] obviously conflict[] 
with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act.”). 
 78. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323–24 (1962). 
 79. See id. at 324 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 337 U.S. at 314). 
 80. Meese, supra note 46, at 797–808. 
 81. Id. at 801–04. 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 83. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1956) (finding that 
product differentiation confers slight monopoly power but does not offend § 2). 
Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:18 PM 
December 2010]   REFRAMING ANTITRUST 475 
the Sherman Act, even when practiced by a monopolist.84 Harvard 
scholars advocated and praised these results, concluding that such 
conduct was consistent with workable competition, because the benefits 
of such conduct would more than counteract any harm.85 This result 
flowed naturally from the partial equilibrium trade-off analysis.86 
B. The Collapse of the Inhospitality Tradition and a New Rule of 
Reason 
More than three decades ago, in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 
the Supreme Court abandoned its hostility to non-standard agreements, 
holding that certain non-price vertical restraints should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason.87 The Sylvania Court acknowledged that such 
restraints reduced rivalry between dealers selling the manufacturer’s 
product.88 Nonetheless, the Court reversed the per se ban on such 
agreements, relying upon reasoning derived from “transaction cost 
economics,” a self-described rival to price theory that revolutionized 
economists’ interpretation of non-standard contracts.89 While the Court 
recognized that such restraints were departures from “pure 
competition,” it concluded that they could produce countervailing 
benefits, albeit not the sort of technological efficiencies recognized by the 
workable competition model.90 In particular, the Court noted that such 
restraints could allow dealers to recoup the benefits of their investments 
 
 84. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 
U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam); see also Meese, supra note 46, at 793–808. 
 85. See 3 Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Principles and 
Their Application ¶ 626b (1978) (contending that § 2 of the Sherman Act should not ban conduct 
producing the “economic results associated with workable competition”); Kaysen & Turner, supra 
note 31, at 44, 268; id. at 22 (“[T]he Sherman Act has been interpreted—and properly, we think—to 
leave room for legal monopolies, that is, for monopolies acquired solely by competitive merit.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 86. See Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure 
Considerations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1525 (1972) (“The dominant firm charged with a violation 
would be able to rebut the presumption of unlawful monopolization by demonstrating that its 
dominance was the result of economies of scale leading to a natural monopoly, of the exercise of an 
unexpired patent or of continuing, indivisible, absolute management superiority.” (footnote omitted)). 
 87. See 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). 
 88. See id. at 54 (“[V]ertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition . . . .”). 
 89. See id. at 51–57; see also Williamson, supra note 66, at 372 (explaining how the Sylvania 
decision reflected advances in economic theory produced by TCE); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting 
Antitrust, 76 Geo L.J. 271, 274 (1987) [hereinafter Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust] (contending that 
TCE was the manifestation of a “genuine scientific revolution”); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics 
of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1440–47 (1974) [hereinafter 
Williamson, Economics of Antitrust] (comparing “received microtheory” and “transaction cost” 
approaches to industrial organization). 
 90. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51–57; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (explaining how Sylvania held that restriction on competition in one portion of 
the market could enhance overall competition). 
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in promotional activities and thereby ensure adequate downstream 
promotion of the manufacturer’s product.91 
Subsequent decisions invoked Sylvania to repudiate per se rules 
against other vertical restraints.92 The Court has also held that certain 
horizontal restraints once deemed unlawful per se should instead be 
analyzed under the rule of reason.93 Lower courts have extrapolated from 
these and other decisions and subjected numerous horizontal restraints 
that were once unlawful per se to rule of reason analysis.94 
The repudiation of various per se rules required courts and agencies 
to articulate a methodology for evaluating such restraints under the rule 
of reason.95 For nearly a century, the goal of such an analysis has been 
clear: Determine whether a challenged restraint produces the 
“consequences of monopoly,” namely, increased market power 
manifesting itself as higher prices, reduced output, or lower quality.96 If 
courts were omniscient planners, they could directly discern whether, in 
fact, a restraint enhanced parties’ ability profitably to reduce output and 
thus raise price above cost—the definition of market power.97 Antitrust 
law, however, is a costly administrative system that cannot replicate the 
conclusions of a perfectly-informed economist.98 Thus, courts and 
agencies conducting rule of reason analysis have developed certain 
shortcuts or proxies for determining whether, in fact, a restraint enhances 
the market power of the parties to it, to the detriment of consumers. 
Both courts and agencies have agreed on certain principles. First, 
where a restraint expressly sets price or output, the mere existence of the 
agreement establishes a prima facie case, regardless of whether the 
 
 91. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55–56 (opining that intrabrand restraints could improve upon a 
“purely competitive situation” by eliminating “free rider effect” and citing work of Richard Posner 
and Robert Bork for the proposition that non-price intrabrand restraints can eliminate “free riding” 
that would occur if manufacturers relied upon unfettered dealer rivalry for product distribution). 
 92. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (reversing the 
per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance). 
 93. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (analyzing a horizontal agreement limiting 
advertising related to price and quality under the rule of reason); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99–104 
(articulating rationale for analyzing restraint on price and output under the rule of reason). 
 94. See generally Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
horizontal restriction on output of broadcast games should be analyzed under a full-blown rule of 
reason); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that horizontal 
agreement depriving a rival of access to important input will be analyzed under the rule of reason); 
Rothery Storage & Van Co., v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
horizontal agreement on minimum prices could produce cognizable benefits and was thus properly 
analyzed under the rule of reason); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that a horizontal agreement on product offerings could produce cognizable benefits and was 
thus properly analyzed under the rule of reason).  
 95. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103–20 (conducting rule of reason analysis after rejecting per se 
condemnation of a challenged horizontal restraint on price and output). 
 96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Carlton & Perloff, supra note 60, at 137–38. 
 98. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.). 
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defendant possesses market power.99 These courts and agencies believe 
that such explicit restraints “obviously” or “evidently” enhance market 
power, to the detriment of consumers.100 This result, it is said, flows from 
“rudimentary economics.”101 
Second, where less explicit restraints are concerned, courts and 
agencies find a prima facie case whenever a restraint causes “actual 
detrimental effects” in the form of higher price, reduced output, or 
reduced quality, again regardless whether the defendant possesses 
market power.102 Whether a restraint actually results in “higher” prices, 
or reduced output, raises the question: “Compared to what?” Courts 
applying this test have employed three different baselines for comparison 
with the prices or output produced by a restraint. Some take a temporal 
approach, comparing the price, output or quality produced by the 
restraint to what defendants actually offered before the restraint.103 
Others compare the price produced by the restraint to the price 
simultaneously charged by firms in other markets not employing such 
 
 99. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (explaining that, in some cases, a 
mere restriction on price or output can suffice to establish a prima facie case); United States v. Brown 
Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 673–74 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying this approach to a horizontal interbrand restraint); 
Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.3 (2000) 
[hereinafter AGCC] (noting that the character of the agreement, without more, can give rise to a 
prima facie case); see also Chi. Prof’l Sports, 961 F.2d at 674–76 (finding that proof of express output 
limitation itself established prima facie case). 
 100. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 769–70; AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3 (noting that the 
character of the agreement can give rise to a prima facie case); cf. FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990) (citing Bork, supra note 60, at 269) (contending that the existence 
of a price fixing agreement suggests that the parties to the agreement believe they possess market 
power). 
 101. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 757, 770 (invoking “rudimentary economics” to justify this 
approach); see NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984) (quoting a 
pamphlet by Professor Areeda for the proposition that in some cases, restraints are so obviously 
anticompetitive that rule of reason analysis “can be applied in the twinkling of an eye” (quoting 
Phillip Areeda, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 
37–38 (1981))). 
 102. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (rejecting defendants’ 
contention that market definition and proof of market power were necessary elements of a rule of 
reason case); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–09 (1984); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.2, at 8 (“Agreements of a 
type that always or almost always tends to raise price or reduce output are per se illegal.”); id. § 1.2, at 
4 (“The central question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the 
ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service or innovation 
below what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.” (emphasis added)); see also 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 256 
n.25 (2d ed. 1999) (“Detrimental effects include observed decreases in output, an observed increase in 
price coordination, or exclusion from the market of firms that seem to be competitive entrants.”); cf. 
Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that proof of market 
power is a necessary ingredient of any rule of reason claim). 
 103. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff established 
a prima facie case by showing that prices for the services governed by the restraint changed after the 
restraint); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.35, at 22 n.50 (discussing a temporal approach). 
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restraints.104 Still others perform a sort of “thought experiment,” asking 
whether removal of the restraint would result in lower prices or higher 
output, thereby employing a hypothetical non-restraint equilibrium as a 
baseline for comparison to the prices and output produced by the 
restraint.105 These approaches are not mutually exclusive—some courts 
have relied upon more than one.106 
Each approach used to discern whether there is a prima facie case 
imagines two worlds: one in which defendants have adopted the restraint 
and one in which the restraint is removed.107 In this way, both decisional 
law and enforcement guidelines identify baselines against which to 
measure the impact of the restraint. These baselines, in turn, constitute 
alternative equilibria to those produced by the restraint.108 According to 
judges and agencies, any price increase (or reduction in output or 
quality) compared to such baselines necessarily reflects a collective 
exercise of market power enabled by the restraint, therefore rendering 
any additional inquiry into market power superfluous.109 This supposed 
 
 104. See, e.g., Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 455–57 (recounting evidence that terms were more 
favorable to consumers in localities without restraints); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 
241 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding the fact that defendants offered more products in foreign markets not 
governed by the restraint than they did domestically relevant to finding that restraints reduced 
“product innovation and output”). 
 105. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–09 (invoking the finding by the trial court that but for restraint, 
prices would be lower and output higher); Visa, 344 F.3d at 240–41 (finding that removal of the 
restraint “would” result in greater and more diverse product offerings). The characterization here of 
NCAA as relying upon a “thought experiment,” as opposed to actual proof of anticompetitive harm, is 
likely controversial. Indeed, leading scholars such as Professor Areeda contended that the NCAA 
opinion rested upon proof of actual anticompetitive harm. See 7 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law: 
An Analysis of Principles and Their Application ¶ 1511, at 430–33 (1986). However, a close 
reading of the Court’s decision confirms that the Court cited no evidence of tangible harm. The Court 
relied heavily upon the trial court’s conjecture that removal of the restraints “would” have resulted in 
higher output and lower prices. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106 n.30 (quoting findings of the district 
court that, absent the challenged restraints, prices and output “would” be different). Indeed, the 
NCAA first imposed the restraints decades before the litigation. Id. at 89–90. Thus the district court’s 
findings were purely conjectural, in that the court merely hypothesized what would occur if the league 
removed the restraints. 
 106. See Visa, 344 F.3d at 240–41 (relying upon the second and third approach to find that plaintiff 
had established a prima facie case). 
 107. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 105–08 (affirming trial court’s finding of a prima facie case by asking 
whether prices would be higher or lower absent the restraint); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.1 (“Rule of 
reason analysis focuses on the state of competition with, as compared to without, the relevant 
agreement.”). 
 108. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–08 (finding that the restraint foreclosed competition because it 
raised prices and lowered output more than would be expected in a competitive market); AGCC, 
supra note 99, § 3.1 (explaining that rule of reason analysis determines whether an agreement 
enhances or reduces output when compared to “the absence of the relevant agreement”). 
 109. See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61 (“Since the purpose of the inquiries into market 
definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine 
adverse effects on competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction in output,’ can 
obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’” 
(quoting 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511, at 429)); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3, at 11 n.28 (quoting 
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exercise of market power constitutes “anticompetitive harm,” and 
reflects an economic state of affairs inferior to that which would occur 
without the restraint.110 Leading scholars, particularly those from the 
Harvard School, have endorsed this approach and the reasoning behind 
it.111 
A prima facie case does not itself establish liability: a defendant can 
still seek to avoid this fate by adducing proof that the restraint produces 
significant benefits that offset any harm.112 However, Supreme Court 
decisions and enforcement guidelines provide that evidence purporting 
to rebut such a case is only cognizable if it tends to show that the 
restraint results in lower prices for the defendants’ product, or at least 
does not raise those prices, as compared to the prices that would occur 
without the restraint.113 That is, courts and agencies assume that a 
purported “benefit” that results in higher prices necessarily reflects an 
exercise of market power and thus simply confirms the initial 
presumption that the restraint produces anticompetitive harm.114 Finally, 
once defendants adduce evidence of significant benefits, courts and 
agencies assume that these benefits coexist with anticompetitive effects, 
irrebuttably presumed once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.115 
 
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61, for the proposition that proof of increased prices obviates 
the need for market power assessment and stating that agencies will only gather information necessary 
to determine the impact of a restraint); see also Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[A]n actual adverse effect on competition arguably is more direct evidence of market power than 
calculations of elusive market share figures.”). 
 110. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–09; AGCC, supra note 99, §§ 3.1, 3.3.  
 111. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511; Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 256; Lawrence A. 
Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook 210–12 (2000) 
(approving NCAA’s rejection of market power inquiry given proof of increased prices). To be sure, 
Professor Areeda opined that “plaintiff must ordinarily allege and prove the market that is allegedly 
restrained and that the defendants occupy a sufficient role in that market to impair competition 
there.” 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1507b, at 397. He did not, however, suggest that proof of market 
power was legally necessary, but instead claimed that plaintiffs would have difficulty proving 
detrimental effects and would thus turn to proof of market power as a surrogate for such effects. See 
id. ¶ 1503, at 376; see also infra notes 122–27 and accompanying text (elaborating on Professor 
Areeda’s position). 
 112. See United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 243–44 (2d Cir. 2003) (evaluating proffered 
benefits after plaintiff established a prima facie case); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th Cir. 
1998) (considering several such justifications). 
 113. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113–14 (finding the purported benefit not cognizable where the trial 
court found that the challenged restraint caused defendants’ prices to rise); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (holding defendants’ claim that restraint enhanced quality by 
preventing competitive bidding rested on an assumption that restraint produced higher prices and thus 
was not cognizable); AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3 (stating that potential benefits will only give rise to 
rule of reason analysis if they “could” offset anticompetitive harm by reducing prices or preventing 
price increases). 
 114. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693; see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Competitor Collaboration after California Dental Association, 2000 U. Chi. Legal F. 
149, 179 (contending that restraints imposed in NCAA were necessarily the result of market power). 
 115. See Meese, supra note 29, at 162 (explaining how the current approach to comparing costs and 
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This assumption underlies the requirement that decisionmakers 
“balance” benefits against harms.116 Given this “coexistence assumption,” 
“mere” proof that the restraint results in lower prices does not entitle the 
defendant to judgment. Instead, the restraint is still unlawful if the 
defendant could achieve the same benefits by means of a less restrictive 
alternative.117 This less restrictive alternative test helps courts avoid 
actually balancing a restraint’s benefits against harms. At the same time, 
the test rests upon the assumption that any benefits produced by the 
restraint necessarily coexist with harms that the restraint purportedly 
produces.118 Absent this assumption, there is simply no reason to assume 
that the restraint is “restrictive,” or to ask whether there is a less 
restrictive means of achieving the same benefits. 
The mode of rule of reason analysis just described dovetails nicely 
with the price-theoretic partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm that 
animated the workable competition model and the inhospitality era and 
still informs the analysis of horizontal mergers and monopolies by courts 
and agencies.119 Like the partial equilibrium model, modern analysis 
begins with an implicit baseline—the price, output, and quality that exists 
before or without the restraint. This partial equilibrium baseline, in turn, 
is an equilibrium—a steady state of affairs—and is also free of 
externalities. Proof that a restraint produces “actual detrimental effects” 
 
benefits rests upon assumption that two effects coexist). But cf. United States v. Brown Univ., 
5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a lack of evidence of tangible harm lightens defendant’s 
burden of articulating benefits). 
 116. See AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.37 (providing that the decisionmaker must determine whether 
efficiencies prevent price increases); id. § 3.3 (explaining that overriding benefits must “offset 
anticompetitive harms”); see also Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass’n, 996 F.2d 537, 543 
(2d Cir. 1993) (“Ultimately [under the rule of reason], it remains for the factfinder to weigh the harms 
and benefits of the challenged behavior.”); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 
595 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he most careful weighing of alleged dangers and potential benefits [is] the 
normal treatment afforded by the rule of reason.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that once defendant proves benefits, plaintiff can 
prevail by showing that “those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner”); 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679; Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.36(b) (“[I]f the 
participants could have achieved or could achieve similar efficiencies by practical, significantly less 
restrictive means, then the Agencies conclude that the relevant agreement is not reasonably necessary 
to their achievement.”); 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶¶ 1505b, 1507b; Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 
257 (endorsing this test for evaluating horizontal ancillary restraints); id. at 487–89 (endorsing this test 
for vertical distribution restraints); Stephen F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law 157–58 (1993) 
(ancillary restraint should be unlawful if “broader than necessary to achieve [its] purpose”); Sullivan 
& Grimes, supra note 111, at 223 (endorsing this test for horizontal restraints); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., 
Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 871, 930 (1994) (endorsing this test for restraints ancillary to joint ventures). 
 118. See Meese, supra note 29, at 167–69 (explaining that a “less restrictive alternative test” rests 
upon the assumption that the restraint’s benefits coexist with harms). 
 119. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (detailing the influence of the partial equilibrium 
trade-off model upon inhospitality era of antitrust); supra note 59 and accompanying text (detailing 
the influence of the partial equilibrium trade-off model on modern merger law and enforcement 
guidelines). 
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compared to this often hypothesized baseline is analogous to proof that, 
say, a merger to monopoly confers market power on the new entity when 
compared to the pre-merger equilibrium state of affairs.120 Moreover, the 
assumption that benefits manifest themselves in the form of lower prices 
as compared to the pre-restraint equilibrium reflects the model’s 
assumption that efficiencies are technological in nature and reduce 
(historical) production costs, when everything else is held constant. 
Finally, the requirement that fact-finders “balance” any benefits against 
harms, as in the merger context, reflects the model’s assumption that 
harms and benefits coexist.121 
As noted above, leading scholars have endorsed the dominant 
approach to rule of reason analysis. Most notably, the modern era’s most 
influential antitrust scholar, the late Phillip Areeda of Harvard Law 
School, embraced the approach described above “hook, line and sinker.” 
One might even say that Professor Areeda invented the approach. In 
1981 and perhaps earlier, Areeda prepared a course for the Federal 
Judicial Center’s “Education and Training Series” for judges on the 
methodology of rule of reason analysis.122 The pamphlet prepared for the 
course was, Professor Areeda said, adopted from forthcoming volume six 
of the author’s massive and influential treatise, the first five volumes of 
which were co-authored with Donald Turner, a co-founder of the 
Harvard School of antitrust.123 The pamphlet anticipated the elements of 
the rule of reason analysis described above.124 Moreover, just three years 
later, the Supreme Court quoted the document at length for the 
proposition that a court could conduct rule of reason analysis without 
determining whether the defendants possessed market power.125 In 1986, 
the Court quoted volume seven of the treatise, this time for the 
proposition that proof of “actual detrimental effects” would establish a 
prima facie case, thereby obviating the need for inquiry into market 
power, which was itself (supposedly) simply a surrogate for such 
effects.126 Professor Areeda himself endorsed the rule of reason 
 
 120. See Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1–3 (2010) 
[hereinafter Joint Merger Guidelines] (detailing standards governing determination of 
concentration, anticompetitive effects, and prospect of entry). 
 121. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining how many treated the trade-off 
paradigm as a key tool for solving antitrust problems); see also Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 
120, at 2–4 (articulating this approach to analyzing mergers). 
 122. See Phillip E. Areeda, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: 
General Issues 37–38 (1981). 
 123. In fact, the substance of the pamphlet did not appear until volume seven of the treatise, which 
appeared in 1986. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511, at 433 n.22 (referring to 1981 work as an 
“earlier version” of this treatise chapter). 
 124. See id. ¶ 1438b, at 8–10 (discussing less restrictive alternative test); id. ¶ 1441e–14441h, at 37–
38, 41–42 (discussing a truncated rule of reason). 
 125. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 n.39 (1984). 
 126. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (“Since the purpose of the 
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methodology announced in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma, and several lower courts have cited his treatise to support 
the dominant method of rule of reason analysis outlined above.127 
Professor Areeda, of course, was heir to the Harvard School of 
antitrust started by Edward Mason, Donald Turner, and Joe Bain during 
the early 1950s, while Areeda was a student at Harvard Law School. 
Beginning in 1975, Areeda and Turner co-authored numerous articles in 
the Harvard Law Review, as well as the first five volumes of the treatise. 
This work, the most influential antitrust scholarship of the twentieth 
century,128 acknowledged one intellectual debt—to Richard Caves, who 
had opined that industrial organization was “applied price theory.”129 
Moreover, the work assumed that the purpose of antitrust law was to 
achieve the “economic results associated with workable competition.”130 
Finally, these scholars argued that “externalities” resulting from 
“transaction costs . . . do not imply any material alteration of antitrust 
policy,” but that, instead, governments should eliminate such market 
failures via regulation.131 It should come as no surprise, then, that this 
leader of the Harvard School would endorse an approach to rule of 
reason analysis reflecting workable competition’s partial equilibrium 
trade-off model and its numerous limiting assumptions. 
Despite its apparent precision, the dominant method of rule of 
reason analysis seems to produce various anomalies, that is, observations 
 
inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the 
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a 
reduction of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate 
for detrimental effects.’” (quoting 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511 at 429)).
 
 127. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, ¶ 1511 (discussing and endorsing NCAA); see also, e.g., Law v. 
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing the treatise for the less restrictive alternative test); 
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown Univ., 
5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass’n, 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
 128. According to Justice Breyer, Supreme Court advocates would rather cite two paragraphs of 
this treatise than the holdings of four courts of appeals and the opinions of three Supreme Court 
Justices. See Langdell’s West Wing Renamed in Honor of Areeda, Harv. U. Gazette (Apr. 25, 1996), 
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1996/04.25/LangdellsWestWi.html. 
 129. See 1 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Principles 
and Their Application, at xvii (1978); see also Caves, supra note 32, at 14 (“The subject of ‘industrial 
organization’ applies the economist’s models of price theory to the industries in the world around 
us.”). 
 130. 3 Areeda & Turner, supra note 85, at 77 (“[Antitrust law] seeks to protect the process of 
competition on the merits and the economic results associated with workable competition.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 131. 2 Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 316. The authors did recognize “only one respect in 
which externalities have implications for antitrust policy,” that is, collaboration to avoid what they 
called “low private-cost but high social-cost method[s] of production.” Id. at 317. The authors 
concluded that courts should not automatically condemn such collaborations as anticompetitive. Id.; 
see also Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 13 n.12 (same); id. at 67 n.25 (“[E]quality of private and 
social costs, especially in the areas relevant to our study, is not a major problem.”). 
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or results inconsistent with those predicted or allowed by the dominant 
paradigm.132 For one thing, the method of analysis seems to preclude any 
real opportunity to show that a restraint produces significant benefits. As 
already noted, parties generally establish a prima facie case by showing 
that the restraint in question results in “actual detrimental effects” by 
increasing prices or reducing output.133 While defendants may supposedly 
offer evidence of benefits in rebuttal, such evidence must tend to show 
that prices fell or did not rise because of the restraint.134 Indeed, 
purported benefits are not even cognizable unless they satisfy this 
criterion.135 This opportunity to rebut the prima facie case seems illusory, 
however, given that the fact-finder has already determined that the 
restraint produces higher prices and/or reduced output. To be sure, the 
defendant is always free to prove that his prices did not, in fact, rise after 
or because of the restraint.136 Still, such proof does not rest upon any 
proof of efficiencies, but instead simply counteracts the prima facie case 
of harm. Absent such proof, any effort to rebut such a case simply by 
demonstrating efficiencies will fail. 
Moreover, the assertion that benefits must manifest themselves as 
reduced prices runs counter to other statements in Supreme Court 
decisions that pro-competitive effects may manifest themselves as higher 
prices.137 For instance, the Supreme Court has twice held that evidence 
tending to show that a manufacturer desires higher resale prices is 
consistent with a pro-competitive account of challenged restraints and 
therefore cannot, without more, justify per se condemnation.138 
Moreover, in NCAA, the Supreme Court indicated that members of an 
amateur sports league could agree to place a ceiling on the compensation 
paid to student athletes without incurring per se liability, even though the 
whole point of such restraints is to produce wages lower than 
competition would produce in a “free market.”139 Finally, the canonical 
example of a “reasonable” restraint—the narrowly-tailored covenant 
ancillary to the sale of a business—will, if successful, result in prices that 
 
 132. See generally Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 60–65 (defining anomalies in 
this way).  
 133. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–95 (1978). 
 136. Cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 278 nn.216–17 (1986) (suggesting that much 
evidence of benefits tends to show the absence of market power harm in the first place). 
 137. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984). 
 138. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1988) (finding that “price 
cutting is frequently made possible by ‘free riding’ on the services provided by other dealers,” and that 
the manufacturer’s concern about price cutting is consistent with a beneficial account of the restraint); 
see also Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762–63 (same); Meese, supra note 29, at 151–52.  
 139. See 468 U.S. at 103 (stating that contractual restrictions on horizontal rivalry were necessary 
to enable the NCAA to differentiate its product from minor league sports). 
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are higher and/or output that is lower than it would otherwise be, 
thereby allowing the party that sought the covenant to reap the fruits of 
its investment. A covenant that did not have such an effect would seem 
worthless, and yet courts have repeatedly enforced such agreements.140 
Perhaps sensing something is amiss, some lower courts have 
adjusted or ignored the dominant test when evaluating restraints they 
believe may be pro-competitive. For instance, some courts describe the 
proffer of evidence of efficiencies without stating that such efficiencies 
must result in lower prices or higher output.141 Others carve out 
exceptions from the dominant test, or ignore it altogether. In Chicago 
Professional Sports Ltd. v. NBA, for instance, the Seventh Circuit 
initially affirmed a preliminary injunction against the NBA’s limit on the 
number of games an individual team could broadcast, holding that the 
explicit restraint established a prima facie case.142 Later in the litigation, 
the court reversed course, holding that proof of market power would be 
an essential element of the plaintiff’s case at trial, even though no one 
disputed that the restraint reduced the output of televised games.143 The 
court distinguished Supreme Court precedent by claiming that the NBA 
reflected greater economic integration than entities previously accorded 
greater scrutiny, a factor the NCAA Court did not mention as relevant to 
its analysis.144 Other decisions have ignored the test altogether, holding 
that plaintiffs must establish that defendants possess “market power” in a 
properly defined market to establish a prima facie case.145 These courts 
have recognized, at least implicitly, that straightforward application of 
current law may condemn restraints that in fact produce benefits without 
any offsetting harm. At the same time, none of these decisions has 
confronted the possible conflict between their conclusions and the 
Supreme Court’s price and output test.146 
 
 140. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688–89 (discussing such agreements as 
quintessential reasonable restraints under § 1 of the Sherman Act); United States v. Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see also United States v. Joint 
Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568–71 (1898) (noting that such restraints are “indirect” and thus not 
unlawful under § 1). 
 141. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 142. See 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 143. See id. at 599–601. 
 144. Id. at 599–600. 
 145. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217–21 (D.C. Cir. 
1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 146. See, e.g., Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 216–23 (finding that the challenged restraint produced 
benefits by increasing promotional expenditures and enhancing demand, without considering the 
possibility that prices rose as a result). 
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II.  Ronald Coase and the Transaction Cost Revolution 
As noted earlier, courts and agencies were once hostile to non-
standard agreements, because they departed from perfect competition 
without any apparent countervailing benefits in the form of product 
differentiation or technological efficiencies.147 Courts began reversing this 
hostility three decades ago, eventually declaring that many such 
restraints should be analyzed under the rule of reason, despite their 
impact on rivalry.148 This revised treatment followed naturally from the 
TCE revolution in economic theory, which undermined the workable 
competition paradigm and offered various beneficial explanations for 
complete and partial integration.149 
This Part details the origins and course of the TCE revolution, 
beginning with a description of the perfect competition model. This 
model, of course, served as the foundation for price theory and its 
workable competition model, including the partial equilibrium trade-off 
model and the concomitant price/output baseline.150 As shown below, the 
model also served as the starting point for Ronald Coase’s pathbreaking 
explanation for the existence of the business firm, the most ubiquitous 
non-standard contract. Coase’s approach, it is shown, was premised upon 
the recognition of antecedent and exogenous, but minor departures from 
perfect competition that give rise to transaction costs and efforts by 
rational market participants to reduce such costs. This Part will focus 
particularly on the evolving definition of “transaction costs” that 
economists extending Coase’s classic case of integration have identified, 
costs that help explain partial integration, which Coase did not explore in 
his published work. This Part also contends that transaction costs are 
usefully divided into two categories that reflect different sorts of 
departures from perfect and often workable competition: technological 
transaction costs and non-technological transaction costs. The former, 
which Coase emphasized in his revolutionary work, entail haggling and 
gathering information and are closely analogous to engineering-based 
production costs always recognized by the perfect competition model 
and price theory more generally. Given this close analogy, the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model readily incorporates the reduction of such 
costs into its methodology for determining the impact of trade restraints. 
As a result, Coase’s work did not by itself seem to call into question 
either the usefulness of the trade-off model or the dominant approach 
for analyzing trade restraints and transactions. The latter, non-
technological costs, which represent extensions of Coase’s classic case, 
 
 147. See supra notes 46, 63–70 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 87–94 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 89–94, 176–98, 228–73 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition, 
including relationship-specific investments, product differentiation, the 
passage of time, imperfectly-specified property rights, and the resulting 
risk of opportunism. As will be seen, application of the trade-off model is 
ill-suited to arrangements that produce these types of efficiencies. 
A. The Perfect Competition Model 
Early twentieth century economists sought to identify and to 
articulate the conditions necessary to “perfect competition.”151 According 
to Nobel Laureate George Stigler, Frank Knight was the first to 
articulate a complete formulation of the model.152 In 1921, Knight listed 
eleven assumptions that, if satisfied, will lead to “perfect competition,” 
including the following nine:153 
1. Members of society compose a cross-section of “normal human 
beings” with the attributes associated with members of Western 
Societies.154 
2. Members act “with ‘complete rationality,’” subject to “ordinary 
human motives.”155 
3. People are free to act on their motives, or people “own 
themselves.”156 
4. There is a “complete absence of physical obstacles to the making, 
execution, and changing of plans at will; that is, there must be ‘perfect 
mobility’ in all economic adjustments, no cost involved in movements 
or changes.”157 
5. “It follows as a corollary from number 4 that there is perfect 
competition.”158 
6. “Every member of Society is to act as an individual only, in entire 
independence of all other persons. . . . . [I]n exchanges between 
individuals, no interests of persons not parties to the exchange are to 
be concerned . . . .”159 
7. “[A]ll preying of individuals on each other” is excluded. “This 
specification is really a corollary from numbers 2 and 3, which exclude 
 
 151. See Stigler, supra note 34, at 1 (describing the evolution of the perfect competition model); see 
also Knight, supra note 35, passim; Pigou, supra note 38, at 172, 213 (discussing “simple 
competition”). 
 152. Stigler, supra note 34, at 11 (“The concept of perfect competition received its complete 
formulation in Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit.”); see also Knight, supra note 35, at 76–
81. 
 153. See Knight, supra note 35, at 76–81. 
 154. Id. at 76. 
 155. Id. at 76–77. 
 156. Id. at 77. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 78. 
 159. Id. According to Knight, the assumption of “[i]ndividual independence in action excludes all 
forms of collusion, all degrees of monopoly or tendency to monopoly.” See id.; see also supra note 63. 
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fraud or deceit and theft or brigandage respectively.”160 
8. “The motives for division of labor and exchange must be present and 
active.”161 
9. “All given factors and conditions are . . . to remain absolutely 
unchanged.”162 
Taken together, Knight said, these various conditions would result in 
“perfect competition” and thus, a general competitive equilibrium, 
namely an allocation of resources that maximized society’s welfare given 
its endowments of labor, other inputs, and technical knowledge.163 
Implicit was the assumption that the state would create and enforce basic 
rights of property and contract, creating an institutional framework that 
was exogenous to the marketplace.164 Moreover, the costs, prices, and 
output in each market would depend, in part, upon technology, derived 
from scientific and engineering considerations reflected in a production 
function.165 Thus, technological improvements would manifest themselves 
as changes in the production function, reduced production cost, and 
lower prices.166 Finally, given its exclusion of information costs, obstacles 
to movement, and the like, the perfect competition model implied that 
production, exchange, and the resulting allocation of resources took 
 
 160. Id. at 78–79. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 85–86; Stigler, supra note 35, at 38. 
 164. See Pigou, supra note 38, at xii, 127–30; see also Friedrich A. Hayek, Free Enterprise and 
Competitive Order, in Individualism and Economic Order, supra note 47, at 110–16 (explaining that 
well-functioning competitive order depends upon a properly-designed “legal framework” of contract, 
property, tort, and business law); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 67 n.25 (explaining that 
adequate property institutions are necessary for the price system to produce an efficient allocation of 
resources); Knight, supra note 35, at 56–57 (“[T]he foundation of the process [to be studied] is the 
private ownership of productive resources—a synonym for individual freedom.”); Stigler, supra note 
35, at 22 (noting that perfect competition depends upon enforcement of contracts and protection of 
private property); infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text (explaining how TCE undermined the 
assumption that the institutional framework is exogenous to market actors). 
 165. See Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 546 (1951) (“Underlying 
economics is technology. As far as we are concerned, the technical expert has completed his job when 
he has handed on to the economist, accountant, or cost engineer the physical relationship between 
output and various inputs. This relationship is called the ‘production function.’ The production 
function tells us how much output we can hope to get if we have so much labor and so much capital 
and so much land, etc.”); Stigler, supra note 35, at 33–34 (noting that production function determines 
the combination of inputs necessary to produce certain outputs); id. at 109–10 (“Production functions 
are descriptive of techniques or systems of organization of productive services, and they are therefore 
taken from disciplines such as engineering and industrial chemistry: to the economic theorist they are 
data of analysis.”); see also Scott Moss, The History of the Theory of the Firm from Marshall to 
Robinson and Chamberlin: The Source of Positivism in Economics, 51 Economica 307, 313 (1984) 
(noting that Pigou’s 1932 perfect competition model assumed a production function based on 
“technological factors [that] were considered to be entirely exogenous to the firm”). 
 166. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 38. 
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place instantaneously.167 By assumption, the perfect competition model 
functioned in a world divorced from time.168 
There was no apparent place for the business firm—complete 
vertical integration—in a perfectly competitive market, or, for that 
matter, partial vertical integration.169 In perfect competition, individual 
owners of factors of production—including labor—allocated resources 
through continuous, costless, voluntary exchanges; there was thus no 
need for vertical integration’s hierarchical direction of economic 
activity.170 Indeed, Knight’s rigorous articulation of the perfect 
competition model omitted any reference to “firms,” relying instead 
upon individuals as the model’s building blocks.171 Still, perhaps because 
firms were ubiquitous, some economists included firms “by fiat” in their 
articulations of the model.172 Others argued that the firm, or at least 
integration from one level to another, was explained by technological 
considerations.173 
 
 167. See Knight, supra note 35, at 78 (“[In perfect competition, e]ach person continuously 
produces a complete commodity which is consumed as fast as produced. The exchange of commodities 
must be virtually instantaneous and costless.”). However, Knight also assumed that production itself 
entailed “a brief interval of time.” See id. at 81. 
 168. See Hayek, supra note 47, at 96 (explaining that satisfaction of perfect competition’s various 
assumptions results in instantaneous equilibrium); Knight, supra note 35, at 81–82; Machovec, supra 
note 34, at 178–79 (describing perfect competition’s instantaneous market clearing); see also Bain, 
supra note 54, at 14–15 (explaining that price theory focuses on determining the “end result” of 
responses to a “fixed set of determinants” and does not generally incorporate questions regarding the 
passage of time and movement from one equilibrium to the next). 
 169. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 1, 4–8 (1983) 
(discussing various degrees of vertical integration); Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, 
Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L.J. 1, 2 (1959) (examining varieties of partial 
contractual integration). 
 170. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, Am. Econ. Rev., Dec. 1972, at 777, 777 (assuming that activities conducted within the 
firm can also be conducted via market transactions). 
 171. See Knight, supra note 35, at 80 n.1 (“[The individualistic world of perfect competition,] in 
contrast with ‘enterprise,’ [is one] in which the operative has lost his responsible status and lives, not by 
the production and sale of a commodity, but by the sale of productive services to an entrepreneur.”); id. 
at 78 (“Each person continuously produces a complete commodity which is consumed as fast as 
produced. . . . Each member of the society is to act as an individual only, in entire independence of all 
other persons.”); see also Pigou, supra note 38 (examining whether the free play of “self-interest” will 
maximize society’s welfare without invoking the existence of firms). 
 172. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 35, at 21 (describing firms and households as the basic economic 
units in society); see also Harold Demsetz, The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, Am. 
Econ. Rev., May 1997, at 426, 426 (“The firm does not play a central role in [neoclassical] theory.”); 
Moss, supra note 165, at 310–11 (concluding that Alfred Marshall derived his theory of the firm 
inductively, by examining characteristics of firms in the real world). 
 173. See William G. Shepherd, Market Power and Economic Welfare 37 (Donald J. Dewey ed., 
1970) (“The cost advantages in a firm may be of two types: technical and pecuniary. Only technical 
economies represent a genuine improvement in social efficiency.”); Williamson, supra note 66, at 366 
(“[A]ccording[] [to price theory], efforts to reconfigure firm and market structures that violated 
‘natural’ boundaries were believed to have market power origins.”). Price theory’s quintessential 
exemplar of technologically-induced vertical integration involved integration of iron and steel 
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As noted earlier, this model, with its unrealistic assumptions and 
implications, formed the foundation of neoclassical price theory as well 
as the model of workable competition and its partial equilibrium trade-
off paradigm.174 Indeed, while workable competition and its trade-off 
paradigm recognized a few departures from perfect competition, both 
also embraced several other assumptions, including the presence of a 
well-functioning institutional framework and the absence of 
opportunism, as well as the resulting externality and market failure.175 
Perfect competition also formed the starting point for Coase’s effort to 
explain the existence of firms, the most ubiquitous non-standard 
contracts.176 That is, while some economists simply assumed that firms 
exist and others attributed them to technological considerations, Coase 
sought a more precise explanation for why these institutions arise. He 
began by asking why firms exist at all, given that all production, and the 
resulting allocation of society’s resources, could, as the perfect 
competition model implied, be “regulated by price movements,”—in 
other words, continuous transactions by individuals.177 Moreover, Coase 
expressly omitted any explanation rooted in the existence or acquisition 
of market power, thereby retaining, at least implicitly, perfect 
competition’s assumption that no entity possesses more than a minuscule 
share of the relevant market and that no entity colludes with others.178 
Instead, Coase found the rationale for the firm in a different and 
slight departure from the rigorous assumptions of the perfect 
 
production to achieve cost savings. Several leading texts of the price-theoretic era employed this 
example. See, e.g., Bain, supra note 31, at 156–57; Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 120; Scherer, 
supra note 41, at 70. Indeed, in 1942, George Stigler referred to this as a “stock” example of 
technological determination of vertical integration. See Stigler, supra note 54, at 22. 
 174. See supra notes 34, 56 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 176. See 7 Areeda, supra note 105, at 235–36 (“[C]onspiracies among unrelated units are relatively 
infrequent.”); see also R. H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, Am. Econ. Rev., Sept. 
1992, at 713, 714 [hereinafter Coase, Institutional Structure] (“[M]ost resources in a modern economic 
system are employed within firms.”). 
 177. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 388 (1937) [hereinafter Coase, Nature 
of the Firm] (“[H]aving regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, 
production could be carried on without any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any 
organisation?”); see also R. H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 3, 4 (1988) 
[hereinafter Coase, Origin] (“[I]f there were atomistic competition, where every transaction involving 
the use of another’s labour, materials or money was the subject of a market transaction, there would 
be no need for organization.” (quoting Coase’s 1932 correspondence) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 178. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 19, 26–27 (1988) 
[hereinafter Coase, Meaning] (“In the early 1930s I was looking for an explanation for the existence of 
the firm which did not depend on monopoly. I found it, of course, in transaction costs.”); Coase, 
Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390–91 (discussing a rationale for the firm without mentioning 
monopoly or market power); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (collecting authorities 
providing that the perfect competition model assumes the absence of cooperation between otherwise 
independent economic units). 
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competition model, namely, the real-world cost of continuous market 
transacting—“concluding a separate contract for each exchange 
transaction”179—a cost that the perfect competition model assumed 
away.180 While perfect competition assumed the absence of obstacles to 
discovering and transacting with trading partners, Coase understood that 
this was not the case in “the real world.”181 According to Coase, the most 
obvious cost of relying upon the price mechanism to conduct economic 
activity was the cost of “discovering what the relevant prices are.”182 Next 
was the cost of “negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each 
exchange transaction which takes place on a market.”183 This explanation 
envisioned firms arising and existing in a world characterized by minimal 
departures from perfect competition.184 To be more precise, Coase 
offered an explanation for firms that was entirely plausible in an 
unrealistic world, with perfectly specified property rights, but without 
specific investments, opportunism, product differentiation, or economies 
of scale. At the same time, as noted earlier, the model of workable 
competition had also relied upon many of the same unrealistic 
assumptions that animated the perfect competition model, including the 
absence of information and bargaining costs.185 Thus, Coase’s account 
could also explain why firms arose in a world with workable competition 
and economies of scale, but again without specific investments, 
opportunism, poorly-specified property rights, or any effort to acquire or 
maintain market power. Ironically, Coase dealt with a broader range of 
transaction costs rooted in other departures from perfect competition in 
private correspondence predating his seminal article.186 Nonetheless, 
Coase concluded that partial contractual integration could eliminate such 
costs.187 Thus, while such costs could explain certain non-standard 
 
 179. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 391–92. 
 180. Coase, Meaning, supra note 178, at 19 (“All that was needed was to recognize that there were 
costs of carrying out market transactions and to incorporate them into the analysis, something which 
economists had failed to do.”); see also Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390 (“The main 
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism.”). Coase was not the only economist to seek an explanation for the existence of firms in 
some departure from perfect competition. More than a decade before Coase’s work, Frank Knight 
argued that firms arise as risk-bearing mechanisms in response to uncertainty. See Knight, supra note 
35, at 233–312. 
 181. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390 n.4 (noting that “static theory,” or perfect 
competition, assumes that all prices are known to everyone, but that “this is clearly not true of the real 
world”); see also Demsetz, supra note 172, at 426. 
 182. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390. 
 183. Id. at 390–91. 
 184. See infra notes 206–10 and accompanying text; see also Demsetz, supra note 172, at 426 (“The 
cost of using the price system was not clearly defined by Coase, although he refers to the costs of 
acquiring price information, negotiating and exchanging.”). 
 185. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 229–38 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 12–13 (discussing portions of 1932 correspondence). 
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contracts, they could not explain the emergence of the particular non-
standard contract known as the firm.188 Because Coase was only 
concerned with explanations for complete integration, his public work did 
not identify this separate category of transaction costs, leaving that task 
to work by others published three decades later.189 
More than three decades later, Coase returned to the subject of 
transaction costs in his pathbreaking work that gave rise to the Coase 
Theorem.190 Scholars who applied Coase’s work on social cost outside the 
context of industrial organization embraced this definition and did not 
relate “transaction costs” to vertical integration.191 Economic actors could 
avoid these costs, Coase said, by instead organizing and conducting the 
very same activity within a firm.192 After all, the firm was basically a 
single contract between entrepreneur and employee, a contract that 
empowered the former to direct the latter without the individualized 
negotiation that characterized a market transaction.193 Reliance on this 
particular contract, then, reduced the discovery and bargaining costs 
parties otherwise would incur when relying upon the market to conduct 
economic activity.194 Firms arose “voluntarily,” he said, because the cost 
of organizing production pursuant to this single, non-standard contract is 
lower than the cost of conducting the same activity via continuous 
market contracting.195 
 
 188. See id. at 13; see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. Econ. 
& Org. 65, 73 (1988) (explaining that complete vertical integration is the “paradigm problem” that 
transaction cost economics seeks to solve). 
 189. See infra notes 239–73 and accompanying text. 
 190. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, 
Social Cost] (“[T]o carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes 
to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations 
leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that 
the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.”). 
 191. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 48–49, 54–57 (3d ed. 1986); Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1106–10 (1972); Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 
22 J.L. & Econ. 141, 144–42 (1979). 
 192. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390–91. 
 193. See id. at 391 (“The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may 
be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits. The 
essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within 
these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.”); see also Scott E. Masten, A 
Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 181, 194 (1988) (explaining that economic actors could 
employ contract law to replicate all of the rights and duties that characterize the employer-employee 
relationship, the distinguishing mark of the business firm). 
 194. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 391 (“A factor of production (or the owner 
thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating 
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the 
working of the price mechanism.”). 
 195. See id. at 389 n.3 (“[F]irms arise voluntarily because they represent a more effective method 
of organising production.”). 
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Several decades later, scholars would rediscover Coase’s insight and 
proceed to identify a wider range of “transaction costs” that might induce 
individuals to abjure reliance on the market in favor of firms.196 These 
costs were the result of departures from perfect competition that were 
different from, and more fundamental than, those that Coase had 
identified.197 We will return to consider these costs later in this Article.198 
It is important to note here, however, that Coase’s 1937 article focused 
only upon the sort of discovery and haggling costs discussed above. 
B. The Technological Nature of Coase’s Transaction Costs 
The sort of discovery and bargaining costs on which Coase did focus 
were those that, by their nature, tended to precede an individual market 
transaction and thus also to precede the production and sale of a final 
product to consumers. Moreover, these costs are virtually 
indistinguishable from any number of the garden-variety production 
costs of technological origin recognized by and incorporated within the 
perfect competition model, costs that need not give rise to firms or other 
non-standard contracts. For instance, an individual may consume 
significant time—a cost—searching for relevant prices.199 He or she may 
also purchase a trade periodical that reproduces prices gathered by the 
periodical’s publisher.200 Like any other input, the production of such 
periodicals will consume scarce resources, and the periodical’s publisher 
will charge a positive price for the publication.201 Or, a party’s potential 
 
 196. Major contributions include: Williamson, supra note 66; Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966); Benjamin Klein et 
al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 
297 (1978); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 92 n.6, 95–
96 (1960) (stating that the “special services” rationale for minimum resale price maintenance does not 
apply to undifferentiated products and applies only to certain “branded products”); Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, Am. Econ. Rev., 
May 1971, at 112. 
 197. See infra notes 253–73 and accompanying text (explaining how transaction costs identified 
during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s depended upon departures from perfect competition such as 
product differentiation, specific investments, and opportunism). Note that transaction costs flowing 
from these departures are “second order” in nature. For instance, product differentiation, while a 
departure from perfect competition, is not itself a cost of transacting. If anything, differentiation can 
reduce such costs. However, the existence of differentiation, or a desire to create it, can create a risk of 
opportunism, and thus, raise the cost of relying upon the market to conduct economic activity. See 
infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 198. See infra Part II.C.  
 199. Cf. Stigler, supra note 47, at 214–16 (explaining that the chief search cost for purchasers is 
time). 
 200. Cf. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390 (“[The cost of discovering relevant 
prices] may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this 
information.”). 
 201. See Knight, supra note 35, at 73–76 (explaining that the cost relevant to perfect competition is 
a sacrificed alternative); Stigler, supra note 35, at 38 (“Costs [relevant to perfect competition] are 
merely the amounts productive services would secure if they were transferred to some other use.”); 
Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:18 PM 
December 2010]   REFRAMING ANTITRUST 493 
trading partners may overcome some of these costs by advertising or 
developing a strong trademark, incorporating these promotional costs in 
their products’ prices.202 Moreover, once a party identifies a favored 
vendor, it will have to contact that vendor and bargain over price and 
quantity.203 This bargaining will also consume resources, including labor 
that bargaining parties could employ elsewhere.204 Finally, if the vendor 
consents to a sale, the parties may memorialize their agreement in 
writing, consuming additional resources, if only paper, ink, and the 
opportunity cost of labor consumed negotiating and preparing the 
agreement.205 
In short, the sort of “transaction costs” Coase emphasized are barely 
distinguishable from the costs that individual economic actors ordinarily 
incur in perfect competition.206 Indeed, one scholar who adopted a 
definition of transaction costs later endorsed by Coase has explained that 
there is little, if any, analytical distinction between these sorts of 
“transaction costs” on the one hand, and production costs on the other.207 
Instead, a choice to rely upon “the market,” with its additional costs, 
would seem indistinguishable from a choice to purchase from a more 
expensive vendor, or to employ less efficient production technology.208 In 
 
Stigler, supra note 47, at 216 (suggesting that localized markets that overcome information costs may 
charge participating sellers a “toll”). 
 202. See Stigler, supra note 47, at 216, 220–24. 
 203. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text. 
 204. See Knight, supra note 35, at 73–76. 
 205. See id. at 63 (explaining how labor is a cost within perfect competition); see also Benjamin 
Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship 
Revisited, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199, 200 (1988) (referring to costs identified by Coase as “ink costs”). 
 206. See Dahlman, supra note 191, at 145; Klein, supra note 205, at 209 (contending that Coase 
equated the cost of relying upon the market with the “narrow transaction costs of discovering prices 
and executing contracts”); see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining how, in perfect 
competition, the production function describes the technological relationship between inputs). 
 207. See Dahlman, supra note 191, at 145 (“[P]roportional transaction costs are productive in 
precisely the same way that resources used up in the physical transformation of inputs into outputs are 
productive—indeed they could be treated in an identical manner with no loss of information.”); id. at 
146 (“[I]t is difficult to see any significant difference between the set up cost of an exchange, called a 
transaction cost, and the set up cost of a basic unit of production, or the fixed cost of a firm.”); id. at 
152 (“[I]t would be desirable to reduce such transaction costs, of whatever kind, preferably to zero if 
that were possible, just as it would be desirable to decrease costs of production in a firm.”); id. at 148 
(“These, then, represent the first approximation to a workable concept of transaction costs: search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.”); see also R. H. 
Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra note 32, at 
1, 6 [hereinafter Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law] (“In order to carry out a market 
transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the 
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being 
observed, and so on.” (quoting Coase, Social Cost, supra note 190, at 15) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); id. at 6 (endorsing Professor Dahlman’s definition of transaction costs). 
 208. Dahlman, supra note 191, at 144 (“Just as self-interested individuals will select the cheapest 
mode of transportation, it is possible to show that they may choose to use a medium of exchange as an 
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the same way, “discovery” by individual actors of the institution known 
as “the firm” is the economic equivalent of the discovery of a new 
production technology.209 Both alter the “production function,” that is, 
the mathematical relationship between inputs and output, and thus 
reduce the costs of producing any given type of output.210 
Although Coase’s article was truly revolutionary, it may not have 
appeared so to practitioners of the traditional price-theoretic model, who 
had already determined that technological considerations determined the 
extent of vertical integration. Indeed, three decades after its publication, 
George Stigler treated Coase’s explanation for the firm and the extent of 
vertical integration as “related” to Stigler’s own technological 
explanation.211 That is to say, Coase’s discovery of a transaction-cost 
explanation for integration did not induce Stigler or other price theorists 
to abandon technological explanations for integration or to reformulate 
the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm.212 Paradigms and their 
practitioners are stubborn, and practitioners of the dominant paradigm 
could well have incorporated Coase’s discovery, which posited only 
minor deviations from perfect competition, within their own price-
theoretic models, including the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm.213 
 
alternative to barter if [fewer] resources are used as a consequence.”). 
 209. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 34 (explaining how “development of new forms of business 
organization” can enhance economic growth); see also Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy 84 (1942) (“[T]he competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new 
source of supply, [or] the new type of organization . . . is much more effective than [price 
competition] . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 210. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 716–18 (explaining how the firm and 
other non-standard contracts alter the institutional framework in a way that reduces costs and changes 
the allocation of resources); see also Stigler, supra note 47, at 216–17 (characterizing used car 
dealership as a specialized firm that arises to reduce the (technological) costs of bringing buyers and 
sellers together). 
 211. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 170–71 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter Stigler, The 
Theory of Price]; id. at 168–70 (discussing Stigler’s own theory of vertical integration, resting on 
division of labor, extent of the market, and economies of scale); Stigler, supra note 47, at 216–17; see 
also Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 65 (stating, albeit in conclusory terms, that 
Stigler’s analysis “does not take us very far”); George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by 
the Extent of the Market, 59 J. Pol. Econ. 185 (1951) [hereinafter Stigler, Division of Labor] 
(articulating this theory of vertical integration in greater detail). 
 212. See M. A. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 29–30 (1949) 
(invoking Coase’s 1937 article, but also repeating and endorsing the typical technological explanation 
for vertical integration). 
 213. See Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 63–65 (explaining that scientists seek to 
tame anomalies by adjusting conceptual categories within existing paradigms); id. at 78 (concluding 
that scientists “will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to 
eliminate any apparent conflict” between predicted and actual results under an existing paradigm). 
Scholars have identified “shadow paradigms” that narrow scholars’ field of vision outside the antitrust 
context. See Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1201, 1227–29 (2001) 
(explaining that much economic analysis of tort law rests upon the “farmer-railroad” exemplar and 
that this reliance has in at least one instance produced misleading results); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow 
of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2177–82, 2197 (1997) (arguing that leading literature on the 
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While scholars would subsequently claim that Coase’s transaction cost 
approach undermined the technological explanation for vertical 
integration, price theorists apparently did not think so at the time.214 
Indeed, in 1952, Coase’s 1937 work was republished as one of several 
“Readings in Price Theory.”215 
This is not to say that Coase explained how firms could arise in a 
perfectly competitive world. Despite their close similarity to ordinary 
production costs, the perfect competition model excluded bargaining and 
information costs by fiat.216 Moreover, firms reduced such costs by 
working other departures from perfect competition. According to Coase, 
the defining characteristic of the firm was “the suppression of the price 
mechanism” for allocating resources.217 This suppression entailed a 
contract between an entrepreneur and employee that suspended, at least 
for a short period, the mobility of the employee, a factor of production.218 
For Coase, the particular contract known as “the firm” eliminated 
transaction costs and thus avoided the market failure that otherwise 
would occur, ensuring that resources moved to their best use, 
unobstructed by the transaction costs the firm avoided.219 This suspension 
of mobility contravened a key assumption of the perfect competition 
model, namely, the complete absence of obstacles to the movement of 
resources, including the absence of any costs of altering such 
movements.220 That is, the institution traded one departure from perfect 
competition for another and improved overall welfare. While the firm 
did not create “perfect competition,” it was a second-best institutional 
arrangement in a world where true perfect competition is not possible.221 
 
distinction between property rights and liability rules rests upon the unarticulated “shadow example” 
of automobile accidents). 
 214. Cf. Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions, Transaction Costs and the New Institutionalism, 
in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare 395, 399–400 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1985) 
(explaining that technical economies cannot explain firm boundaries because, absent transaction costs, 
such economies can “be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned by independent 
individuals”). 
 215. See Readings in Price Theory (George J. Stigler & Kenneth E. Boulding eds., 1952). 
 216. See Knight, supra note 35, at 76–82; see also id. at 20 (perfect knowledge is the “prime 
essential” to perfect competition); Stigler, supra note 47, at 213 (explaining that economic theory 
generally ignores the cost of acquiring information). 
 217. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 389 (“[T]he distinguishing mark of the firm 
is the supersession of the price mechanism.”). 
 218. See id. at 391–92. 
 219. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Knight, supra note 35, at 77 (“[The perfect competition model] assume[s] complete 
absence of physical obstacles to the making, execution, and changing of plans at will; that is, there 
must be ‘perfect mobility’ in all economic adjustments, no cost involved in movements or changes.”); 
see also Stigler, Competitive Price, supra note 35, at 21 (including absence of “institutional restraints” 
on resource movement as a requirement of perfect competition). 
 221. See Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 67–68 (asserting that non-standard 
contracts and other practices inexplicable under price theory are often necessary for “bringing about a 
competitive situation”); cf. Hayek, supra note 47, at 96 (suggesting that many activities inconsistent 
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The world of perfect competition was, like the world without friction, 
only a thought experiment.222 
Coase showed how this world was less imaginary than it first 
seemed. While others accepted the bargaining and discovery costs that 
prevented perfect competition from arising, Coase explained how the 
firm itself, a voluntary institution, could overcome such costs.223 In so 
doing, Coase demonstrated that transaction costs are not necessarily 
exogenous or given, but instead can depend upon background legal 
rules.224 Indeed, the contingency of transaction costs upon background 
rules and institutions was a theme of Coase’s later work.225 A well-
functioning firm, then, eliminated the costs that prevented an otherwise 
atomistic market from reaching perfect competition. Though not 
necessary in the imaginary world of perfect competition, the firm made 
such competition possible, or at least more possible, than it otherwise 
would be.226 This function was perhaps so taken for granted that 
economists often ignored the question that Coase posed and treated the 
firm—and not individuals—as the most basic productive unit of 
analysis.227 
C. Non-Technological Transaction Costs 
As noted earlier, the ex ante haggling and discovery costs that 
Coase emphasized in 1937 did not exhaust the costs that may arise when 
individuals rely upon the market to conduct economic activity.228 This 
should come as no surprise, as the costs that Coase identified represent 
only one sort of departure from both perfect and workable competition 
models—and a contrived departure at best—that impacts the cost of 
relying on market contractions to conduct economic activity. Other 
 
with perfect competition are in fact methods of achieving a more “competitive” result); Dahlman, 
supra note 191, at 144–46. 
 222. Knight, supra note 35, at 6–11 (analogizing economist’s modeling techniques to those 
employed by physicists, and analogizing unrealistic assumptions of economists to physicists’ 
assumption of “perpetual motion at every stage”); Thomas S. Kuhn, A Function for Thought 
Experiments, in The Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 240; see also Stigler, supra note 35, at 24 
(analogizing assumptions of perfect competition to physicists’ assumption of a world without friction). 
 223. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 389–91. 
 224. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 717–18 (explaining how background rules 
construct the institutional framework and thereby impact the allocation of resources); Coase, Social 
Cost, supra note 190, at 15–16, 19. 
 225. See, e.g., Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, passim; see also Coase, The Firm, the 
Market, and the Law, supra note 207, at 28 (“[The law can] make transactions more or less costly by 
altering the requirements for making a legally binding contract.”). 
 226. See Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 68 (contending that non-standard 
contracts and other suspect practices are often methods of “bringing about a competitive situation”). 
 227. See Stigler, supra note 35, at 21; Demsetz, supra note 172, at 426 (stating that firms are 
present in perfect competition). 
 228. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:18 PM 
December 2010]   REFRAMING ANTITRUST 497 
departures producing such costs could include the passage of time 
between transactions, investments specific to particular relationships, 
threats of opportunism, or poorly-specified property rights. 
Indeed, even before he published The Nature of the Firm, Coase 
explained—in unpublished correspondence—how vertical integration 
could overcome opportunism made possible by relationship-specific 
investments and the passage of time.229 Coase posited the example of a 
manufacturer who installed specialized equipment to serve the needs of 
distinct customers.230 By installing this equipment, Coase said, the 
manufacturer would render itself vulnerable to what modern economists 
call opportunism, that is, the possibility that, after the passage of time, 
the special customer might take its business elsewhere, leaving the 
supplier with new but unused equipment.231 Or, the customer could 
“merely” threaten this course, inducing the manufacturer to renegotiate, 
and reduce its price below the manufacturer’s average cost.232 This 
prospect of opportunism, Coase concluded, would cause the supplier 
contemplating such an investment to internalize the tangible risk that the 
original investment in the equipment would lead to lower than normal 
returns because of subsequent opportunism.233 This risk, in turn, would 
raise the manufacturer’s cost of capital accordingly.234 The manufacturer 
would have to cover this cost, by passing it on to its purchaser as part of 
the price of the inputs produced by the specialized equipment.235 
By relying upon the market (“transacting”) to purchase specialized 
inputs, then, the purchaser in Coase’s example would incur a cost: the 
premium its supplier would charge to compensate itself for the risk of the 
purchaser’s opportunism. To avoid this transaction cost, the purchaser 
might integrate backwards, taking on the manufacturing process itself, 
thereby avoiding a transaction, eliminating the prospect of opportunism, 
and minimizing the cost of obtaining the input.236 Or, the customer might 
take the less drastic course, namely, relying upon the market to purchase 
inputs while agreeing not to take its business elsewhere, or, in other 
words, to deal exclusively with the supplier, thereby eliminating the risk 
 
 229. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 12–13 (reproducing and discussing portions of Coase’s 
1932 correspondence). 
 230. Id. at 13. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.; see also Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35 (formalizing the result that a firm relying 
upon the market to distribute its product will charge a premium reflecting any risk of opportunism). 
 236. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13 (“[I]f the consuming firm decides to make this 
product this risk is absent and it may well be that this difference in capital costs may well offset the 
relative inefficiency in actual operating.”). 
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of opportunism that would otherwise result in a premium.237 Indeed, as 
explained earlier, Coase did not pursue this opportunism-based 
explanation for the existence of firms, because he believed that this less 
drastic alternative of partial integration could eliminate these costs.238 
About forty years later, other scholars would rediscover Coase’s 
identification of specific investments as a source of transaction costs, and 
embellish Coase’s then-unknown point with express reference to the 
concept of opportunism.239 These scholars argued that market transacting 
in the presence of relationship-specific investments and passing time 
could render one or both parties vulnerable to post-transaction 
opportunism.240 Parties could avoid such opportunism in one of two ways. 
First, they could abjure the specific investment, thereby forgoing the 
benefits of specialization, and relying instead upon general technology 
producing undifferentiated inputs.241 Or, the parties could avoid these 
costs by complete or partial integration.242 At the same time, these 
scholars took issue with Coase’s claim that partial integration could 
always eliminate these costs.243 
Even before these scholars “rediscovered” Coase’s insight, others 
were identifying non-technological costs of relying upon the market and 
explaining how complete or partial contractual integration might 
overcome them. Perhaps most famously, Lester Telser argued in 1960 
that the production of promotional services by independent retailers is 
susceptible to free riding by such retailers, leading to suboptimal 
 
 237. See Klein et al., supra note 196, at 308–09 (explaining how an exclusive dealing contract can 
reduce the threat of opportunism); see also Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35 (explaining that 
adoption of a contract eliminating opportunism will eliminate the price premium). 
 238. See Coase, Meaning, supra note 178, at 30–31 (describing pre-1937 notes concluding that the 
desire to avoid fraud by trading partners was not an impetus to integration); Coase, Origin, supra note 
177, at 15–16 (reproducing correspondence in which Coase concludes that parties could eliminate the 
risk of such opportunism by means of partial integration, thereby suggesting that the risk of such 
opportunism was not a significant cause of complete vertical integration). 
 239. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 
20–40, 82–105 (1975) [hereinafter Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies]; see also Klein et al., supra 
note 196; Williamson, supra note 188, at 65–66 (articulating the mainstream view regarding 
rediscovery of Coase’s insight). 
 240. See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 196, at 297–302 (explaining how the article is an application 
of “Coase’s fundamental insight”); Williamson, supra note 188, at 66–72; id. at 71 (“The intertemporal 
governance of contractual relations is greatly complicated as a consequence of this condition [bilateral 
dependence caused by relationship-specific investments].”). 
 241. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 31–32 (explaining that, where asset specificity is absent, 
discrete market contracting functions well despite bounded rationality and opportunism); Langlois, 
supra note 47, at 7–8, 11–14 (explaining that specific investment can deepen specialization and 
enhance welfare). 
 242. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 90–98; Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–307. 
 243. See Klein, supra note 205, at 200–11 (taking issue with Coase’s argument that parties can 
employ long-term contracts to prevent opportunism); see also Klein et al., supra note 196, at 302–07 
(detailing purported shortcomings in efforts to control opportunism via partial integration). 
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production of such services.244 Telser surmised that minimum resale price 
maintenance (“RPM”) agreements between manufacturers and dealers 
could forestall such behavior by ensuring that dealers who promote a 
manufacturer’s differentiated product can recoup the rewards of doing 
so.245 Absent such restraints, he said, a dealer might expend resources 
promoting the manufacturer’s product—a relationship-specific 
investment—only to find dealers who did not make such investments 
subsequently luring away customers with discounts.246 Telser did not 
mention Coase’s work, transaction costs, or opportunism. Still, he 
expressly limited his argument to instances in which promotional services 
were “specific to the commodity” produced by the manufacturer, and his 
work plainly rested on the realization that reliance upon market 
transacting to conduct economic activity—here, promotion and 
distribution—imposed a cost, in the form of foregone sales, upon a 
manufacturer as a result of dealers’ opportunism.247 Moreover, Telser 
posited that rational manufacturers would anticipate such post-
transaction costs and seek to minimize them through non-standard 
contracting, namely RPM.248 
Just six years later, Robert Bork expanded Telser’s analysis and 
began to integrate it with Coase’s original work. In particular, Bork 
reiterated Coase’s 1937 insight that the institution known as “the firm” is 
just one form of contractual integration, analogous to other forms of 
partial, contractual integration.249 According to Bork, partial integration 
in the form of minimum RPM or exclusive territories could allow firms 
that relied upon independent dealers—the market—to distribute their 
goods so as to ensure the same type and amount of promotion that a fully 
integrated firm would produce.250 At the same time, Bork did not 
expressly refer to “transaction costs” or “market failure,” but instead 
 
 244. See Telser, supra note 196, at 89–96. 
 245. See id.; see also id. at 95–96 (explaining that the argument depended upon the assumption that 
the product in question was branded and thus differentiated). As Telser noted, Ward Bowman had 
previously pointed out that minimum RPM could prevent “spillovers” that characterized promotional 
services like advertising and demonstrations. See id. at 89 n.4 (citing Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The 
Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 825, 840–43 (1955)). 
 246. See id. at 89–96. 
 247. See id. at 89 (“We must understand these retailers’ services to be specific to the commodity 
[produced by the manufacturer] and unrelated to the retailers’ methods of generally doing business.”). 
 248. See id. at 91–92. 
 249. See Bork, supra note 196, at 384. 
 250. See id. at 429–39; id. at 472 (“In economic analysis, a contract integration is as much a firm as 
an ownership integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through the Sherman Act 
should be the same.”). Bork implicitly assumed that the fully integrated firm he hypothesized 
flawlessly pursued its owners’ interests. As I have explained elsewhere, however, manufacturers may 
rely upon dealers to distribute their goods precisely because their employees do not possess the 
incentives necessary to pursue owners’ interests. See Alan J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand 
Restraints, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 553, 595–98 (2004). Thus, promotion by a fully integrated firm may not 
replicate that achieved by properly incentivized independent dealers. Id. 
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claimed that his analysis followed directly from “basic price theory,” a 
contention subsequently repeated by Richard Posner.251 Moreover, he 
plainly recognized that a manufacturer’s reliance upon an unrestrained 
market to distribute its goods could entail a cost, which Bork measured 
as the deviation from the promotional expenditures and economic results 
that a completely integrated (and properly incentivized) firm would 
achieve.252 
The Telser/Bork argument rested upon several departures from 
perfect competition, as well as some beneficial departures from workable 
competition. These included relationship-specific investments, product 
differentiation, the passage of time between promotional investments, 
and when those investments bear fruit.253 However, these beneficial 
conditions also created a risk of opportunism, and thus externality and 
market failure, given the imperfect specification of property rights 
preventing dealers from recouping the benefits of promotional 
investments in an atomistic market.254 As Bork explained, intrabrand 
restraints could function as a sort of contractual property right, thereby 
altering the institutional framework in a way that changed the content of 
economic activity and resulted in optimal promotional expenditures.255 
Other scholars built on this foundation, elaborating on how various non-
standard contracts could reduce the cost of relying upon the market. 
Tying contracts, franchising, and exclusive dealing—all could overcome 
market failure and thus, reduce transaction costs.256 
Practitioners of workable competition had assumed away bargaining 
and information costs, specific investments, the passage of time, and the 
 
 251. See Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L.J. 950, 952 
(1968) (“[The contention that] r.p.m. creates an efficient utilization of resources [is] grounded in basic 
price theory.”); see also Bork, supra note 60, at 116–17 (contending that price theory is the only 
methodology capable of informing a rational antitrust policy); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School 
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 932 (1979) (“The Chicago School has largely prevailed 
with respect to its basic point: that the proper lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory.”). 
 252. See Bork, supra note 196, at 434–36 (treating promotion produced by a completely integrated 
firm as a baseline against which to measure the impact of non-standard contracts on promotional 
decisions). 
 253. See Telser, supra note 196, at 87 (asserting that market power due to product differentiation is 
a necessary condition for use of minimum RPM to overcome market failure). 
 254. Id. at 89–96 (explaining promotional expenditures and free riding). Absent the passage of 
time, for instance, a manufacturer could constantly observe and respond to suboptimal promotion by 
dealers. See infra note 261. 
 255. See Bork, supra note 251, at 956 (suggesting that RPM confers the equivalent of property 
rights on dealers); Meese, supra note 250, at 595–607; id. at 602 & n.266 (collecting authorities 
suggesting that non-standard contracts, including minimum RPM, create contractual property rights). 
 256. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 
28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 349–54 (1985); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” 
Contractual Arrangements, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1980, at 356 [hereinafter Klein, Transaction Cost 
Determinants]; Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1982); Paul H. Rubin, The 
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & Econ. 223 (1978). 
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resulting threat of opportunism borne by firms that relied upon 
unbridled markets to conduct economic activity.257 Both Coase’s 
unpublished speculations and more modern practitioners of TCE 
reversed this presumption, assuming several departures from the perfect 
competition model in addition to those emphasized in Coase’s 1937 
article.258 For instance, both accounts assumed a conscious effort to 
produce differentiated products in response to varying consumer 
preferences. Such differentiation would, of course, contravene the 
perfect competition model’s assumption of homogenous products. 
Moreover, if such differentiation conferred market power on a seller, 
such power would itself contravene perfect competition. These accounts 
also assumed that market actors might make investments specific to 
particular relationships or customers, thereby enhancing product quality 
but creating assets not readily transferred to other uses.259 Immobility of 
such specific investments contravenes the assumptions of perfect 
competition and workable competition, namely that resources can be 
redeployed instantly and without cost.260 
These accounts also assumed that time would pass between initial 
investment and subsequent economic activity.261 This passage of time, 
combined with specific investments, created the prospect that trading 
partners might behave opportunistically, appropriating or threatening to 
appropriate investments made by others.262 Such opportunism, an 
externality, was only possible because property rights were poorly 
specified.263 These departures from perfect competition were not 
themselves transaction costs, in the same way that, say, the cost of 
 
 257. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 258. Cf. Yoram Barzel & Levis A. Kochin, Ronald Coase on the Nature of Social Cost as a Key to 
the Problem of the Firm, 94 Scandinavian J. Econ. 19, 25 (1992) (noting that Coase’s 1937 “discussion 
of transaction costs” is “brief and cryptic”). 
 259. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13 (“Suppose the production of a particular product 
requires a large capital equipment which is, however, specialized insofar that it can only be used for 
the particular product concerned or can only be readapted at great cost.”); Klein et al., supra note 196, 
at 299 (“Once installed, an asset may be so expensive to remove or so specialized to a particular user 
that if the price paid to the owner were somehow reduced the asset’s services to that user would not be 
reduced.”); Langlois, supra note 47, at 7–8, 11–14 (noting that specific investments can enhance 
specialization and product quality). 
 260. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 261. Cf. Posner, supra note 191, at 93–95 (explaining how the passage of time between sale and 
performance can result in opportunistic breach of contract). 
 262. Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–302 (explaining how the authors’ model assumes that the 
seller purchases distinctive asset that it utilizes over time, and that purchasers are opportunistic); cf. 
Knight, supra note 35, at 78–79 (“[Perfect competition model excludes] preying of individuals upon 
each other [including] fraud or deceit and theft or brigandage.”). Some scholars believed the exclusion 
of fraud and similar behavior to be redundant with the model’s assumption of perfect information. See 
Stigler, supra note 35, at 22. 
 263. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1967, at 347, 
348–49 (explaining how well-defined property rights induce property holders to internalize the social 
costs and benefits of their actions). 
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acquiring information was, nor were they exogenous, as they might result 
from conscious efforts by rational economic actors to depart from perfect 
competition. Instead, these departures were conditions—sometimes 
beneficial—that could ultimately give rise to such costs.264 According to 
Coase and others, these pervasive departures from perfect and workable 
competition in the real world ensured that reliance on atomistic markets 
to conduct economic activity would entail a cost of transacting and 
produce a market failure and externality resulting in a suboptimal 
allocation of resources.265 Taken together, each of these conditions 
combined to increase the cost of relying upon discrete market 
transactions to conduct economic activity. Moreover, unlike the costs 
that Coase had emphasized, these latter costs had no analogue in the 
technological costs recognized by the foundational model of perfect 
competition, which had assumed perfectly-specified property rights and, 
for instance, excluded opportunism, specific investment, and product 
differentiation by fiat.266 Put another way, these costs were non-
technological in origin, and contracts that reduced them produced non-
technological efficiencies.267 Indeed, according to scholars who identified 
this category of transaction costs, technological considerations could 
never explain the existence of a firm or an existing firm’s decision to 
integrate.268 
These departures from perfect competition differed from those 
Coase invoked in another way as well. Unlike bargaining and 
information costs, some of these departures could actually enhance the 
welfare of consumers and the rest of society, by inducing an allocation of 
resources superior to that produced by atomistic rivalry. For instance, the 
specialized equipment in Coase’s original unpublished example could 
produce a differentiated input that the purchaser could in turn use to 
 
 264. See supra note 197 (explaining how one might characterize these as “second order transaction 
costs”). 
 265. See Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra note 207, at 26 (contending that 
pervasive transaction costs render externality and market failure ubiquitous); Williamson, supra note 
66, at 103–30 (“Vertical integration . . . is more consistent with transaction cost economizing than 
with . . . alternatives.”); Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 239, at 20 (“[A] 
presumption of market failure is warranted where it is observed that transactions are shifted out of a 
market and into a firm . . . .”). 
 266. See Knight, supra note 35, at 78–79 (excluding preying of individuals on one another by fiat). 
 267. Cf. Williamson, supra note 66, at 86–90 (explaining why technological considerations 
generally cannot explain vertical integration); Goldberg, supra note 214, at 396–97 (contending that 
price theory errs in assuming that production costs are unrelated to institutional arrangements, 
including ownership of relevant inputs). 
 268. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 86–90; Goldberg, supra note 214, at 397 (explaining that 
technical economies cannot explain the boundaries of the firm because, absent transaction costs, such 
economies can “be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned by independent 
individuals”). 
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produce a differentiated product for sale to consumers.269 Moreover, a 
firm that produced a differentiated product could thereby enhance 
consumer welfare by better catering to unique tastes and preferences.270 
Even doctrinaire price theorists had recognized that product 
differentiation, though a departure from perfect competition, could 
actually enhance the welfare of consumers, despite accompanying market 
power.271 
Under these accounts, then, complete and partial integration did far 
more than simply reduce the cost of identifying and bargaining with 
suppliers. Instead, such restraints altered the institutional framework in 
which economic activity took place, thereby changing incentives and the 
ultimate content of economic activity, such as price, output, and the 
quality thereof.272 Like the rationale for integration Coase identified in 
1937, this explanation does not rest upon any assumption that the 
restraint exercised market power by reducing output, or increasing price 
above costs.273 Moreover, this change was for the better, as it entailed 
various forms of activity that antitrust policy encourages. 
III.  A Transaction Cost Critique of the Rule of Reason 
Standard 
As explained earlier, antitrust law and enforcement policy at one 
time reflected significant hostility toward non-standard contracts, 
hostility derived from price theory’s partial equilibrium trade-off 
paradigm.274 This hostility manifested itself as declarations that various 
non-standard contracts were unlawful per se, or nearly so. The work of 
several scholars identifying various transaction costs and contractual 
solutions thereto influenced courts and agencies, causing both to 
abandon per se treatment of numerous restraints.275 In particular, courts 
have held that many non-standard contracts, while restrictive of atomistic 
 
 269. Langlois, supra note 47, at 7–8, 11–14 (explaining how asset-specificity can deepen 
specialization, enhance productivity, and create unique capabilities). 
 270. See sources cited supra note 41 (collecting authorities contending that product differentiation 
can increase product variety and thus consumer welfare). 
 271. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 717–18 (arguing that background rules 
construct an institutional framework that impacts the allocation of resources). 
 273. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining Coase’s assertion that his theory of the 
firm was independent of market power considerations). 
 274. See supra notes 63–86 and accompanying text (describing the so-called “inhospitality era” of 
antitrust law and the partial equilibrium paradigm that drove it). 
 275. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997) (reversing the per se ban on maximum resale 
price maintenance); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98–104 (1985) 
(holding that certain restraints on price and output should be analyzed under the rule of reason); 
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (reversing the per se ban on non-price 
vertical restraints); see also Meese, supra note 29, at 141–44 (recounting the influence of transaction 
cost reasoning on antitrust law during this period). 
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competition, might nonetheless be necessary to produce benefits treated 
as cognizable under the antitrust laws.276 Such benefits, it should be 
noted, were distinct from technological benefits, such as economies of 
scale and product differentiation, that courts had previously recognized.277 
In some cases, courts and scholars recognized cognizable benefits 
similar to those identified by Coase, that is, the reduction of bargaining 
and information costs.278 Indeed, some scholars believe these “mundane” 
costs to be the more important determinant of vertical integration.279 
More often, however, courts and scholars have relied upon assertions 
that such restraints can reduce non-technological transaction costs.280 A 
finding that a restraint may reduce either sort of cost obviates per se 
condemnation, since such restraints no longer lack redeeming virtue, 
which is a necessary element of per se condemnation under the Sherman 
Act.281 
In holding that non-standard contracts could produce “redeeming 
virtues,” courts recognized that arrangements inconsistent with the 
conditions of perfect competition could enhance the welfare of 
consumers, even if they might lead to market power.282 Still, recognition 
of such efficiencies as cognizable and relevant to antitrust analysis does 
not ensure that agencies and courts would properly evaluate such 
 
 276. See Meese, supra note 29, at 141–44 (documenting the influence of transaction cost reasoning 
upon various per se rules); see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54 (“Vertical restrictions . . . achieve certain 
efficiencies in the distribution of [manufacturers’] products. These ‘redeeming virtues’ are implicit in 
every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason.”). 
 277. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text. 
 278. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1979) (invoking the 
propensity of restraint to reduce bargaining and information costs as a rationale for rule of reason 
treatment); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 378 (describing numerous such costs firms may 
reduce via vertical integration); Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 
26 J.L. & Econ. 497, 538–40 (1983) (explaining how certain tying contracts could reduce search costs); 
cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 43–44 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that a contract’s propensity to reduce monitoring and search costs militated against rule of 
reason condemnation). 
 279. See generally Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 27 Org. 
Stud. 1389 (2006) (arguing that these types of transaction costs provide a better understanding of the 
evolving relationship between markets and firms). 
 280. See e.g., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51–57 (relying upon scholarly articles invoking transaction cost 
to identify benefits of vertical restraints); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 
F.2d 210, 221–23 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189–90 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
 281. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (holding that a restraint is 
unlawful per se if it always, or almost always, is anticompetitive and always, or almost always, lacks 
“redeeming virtue” (quoting N. Pac. RR. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958))). 
 282. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1984) (finding that 
cooperation that “differentiates” college football from other sports produces cognizable benefits); id. 
at 103 (explaining how restraint on rivalry in one part of the market could enhance overall welfare); 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56 n.25 (finding that intrabrand restraints can facilitate promotion conveying 
information about differentiated products); id. at 55 (noting that a “purely competitive situation” 
might result in insufficient promotion). 
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agreements under the rule of reason. Indeed, as explained earlier, lower 
courts and scholars have offered competing approaches to rule of reason 
analysis.283 
What, though, about the approach to rule of reason analysis taken 
by the Supreme Court and enforcement agencies, with its singular focus 
on price or output within the partial equilibrium framework?284 Both 
presume that a restraint is unlawful if it results in higher prices or lower 
output.285 Moreover, once this presumption arises, courts and agencies 
ask whether any benefits of the restraint “outweigh” or “offset” the 
perceived harms, by reducing prices or preventing their increase as 
compared to the pre-restraint baseline, for instance.286 If, despite these 
benefits, the restraint still leads to a higher price, courts and agencies 
conclude that the agreement is an exercise of market power to the 
detriment of consumers.287 Leading scholars have endorsed this approach, 
which the Harvard School began to articulate and embrace in the early 
1980s.288 
Will this approach separate harmful contracts from those that are 
beneficial? To answer this question, this Part will compare and contrast 
current law’s treatment of two different sorts of restraints, each of which 
reduces the cost of transacting, broadly-defined, albeit in different ways. 
As will be seen, current law properly declines to condemn restraints that 
reduce technological transaction costs without creating market power. At 
the same time, even if properly applied, current law seems to condemn 
restraints that significantly reduce non-technological transaction costs, 
even though such restraints avoid per se condemnation precisely because 
they might reduce such costs. 
 
 283. Compare Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188–91 (proof that defendants possess market power is a 
necessary ingredient of any rule of reason claim), and Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 
63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 19–23 (1984) (contending, inter alia, that absence of market power should doom a 
plaintiff’s case under the rule of reason), with Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[A]n actual adverse effect on competition . . . arguably is more direct evidence of market power than 
calculations of elusive market share figures.”), and Mark Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in 
Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 38–45 (2000) 
(contending that proof of anticompetitive harm should suffice to establish a prima facie case regardless 
of market power). 
 284. See supra notes 99–118 and accompanying text. 
 285. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–11; AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.3; see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459–63 (1986) (holding that proof of detrimental effects suffices to establish 
prima facie case). 
 286. See supra notes 116, 121 and accompanying text (describing the requirement that courts 
“balance” a restraint’s benefits against presumed harms). 
 287. See supra notes 109–10, 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 48, 111 and accompanying text. 
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A. Two Examples of Transaction Cost Reduction 
Consider two different restraints that may reduce transaction costs. 
First, a small firm may integrate backward by purchasing a supplier to 
reduce the cost of discovering inputs and haggling over terms of trade.289 
Second, consider a more complicated story, drawn from an actual case, 
whereby rivals and potential rivals in the grocery business form a joint 
venture to develop and produce products similar (but not identical) to 
those already sold by members in competition with each other.290 Assume 
further that the venture sells its product to these rivals who in turn 
distribute the output to consumers, and that such distribution requires 
product-specific promotional expenditures.291 Moreover, assume that the 
new venture assigns rivals exclusive territories where they may distribute 
the venture’s output.292 Finally, assume that this arrangement prevents 
venture members from free riding on each other’s promotional 
expenditures and thus, ensures that each venture member expends 
optimal resources on promotion.293 In this way, one can say, the venture 
ensures that members’ promotional activity replicates that of a fully 
integrated firm producing the same product.294 Absent such restraints, the 
venture might produce the new product, but no one would promote it. 
Both of these arrangements reduce the cost of relying upon the 
market—conceived at the highest level of generality—to conduct 
economic activity.295 Still, they do so in very different ways. The first—
backwards integration to reduce information and haggling costs—
impacts only one relevant variable: the pre-transaction technological cost 
of discovering and negotiating with trading partners. Thus, the restraint 
reduces the cost of producing unchanged output that postdates the 
transaction, a reduction analogous to a reduction in production costs 
 
 289. See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 177, at 390–91 (emphasizing these sorts of costs); see 
also Hovenkamp, supra note 102, at 378 (describing, in intricate detail, various bargaining and 
information costs that firms may seek to avoid by means of vertical integration). 
 290. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 602–05 (1972). The Topco venture produced 
numerous “private label” products for sale in venture members’ stores. United States v. Topco 
Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Thus, venture members sought to replicate the 
private label offerings of vertically-integrated rivals. See id at 1033–35. 
 291. Cf. Telser, supra note 196, at 89 (providing a benevolent account of minimum RPM that 
assumes dealers’ services are specific to the manufacturer’s product). 
 292. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 607–11 (evaluating such a venture). 
 293. See Bork, supra note 196, at 429–39 (explaining how such restraints can facilitate promotion in 
this manner); see also Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1042–43 (finding that horizontal territorial restraints 
ancillary to a legitimate joint venture facilitated and encouraged promotional expenditures to the 
ultimate benefit of consumers). 
 294. See Bork, supra note 196, at 434–36 (explaining how such restraints can replicate promotional 
expenditures by a fully-integrated firm). 
 295. I do not mean to suggest that contractual integration always produces significant economic 
benefits. Nor do I assume that such restraints never produce economic harm. I mean only to employ 
an example of a restraint that plainly produces significant benefits without any offsetting harm as a 
means of illustrating the current law’s inadequacy at dealing with such restraints. 
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caused by, say, a realization of economies of scale.296 An economist would 
model this particular reduction in transaction costs within the partial 
equilibrium framework by shifting the firm’s cost curve downward.297 Nor 
is there any reason to suspect that the transaction will alter the demand 
schedule for the product in question. As a result, output of the same, 
unchanged product would rise and price would fall compared to the 
status quo ante, that is, a baseline consisting of the price and output that 
existed before the integration. Moreover, removal of the restraint would 
lead to higher prices and reduced output. 
Thus, a plaintiff challenging this first restraint could not make out a 
prima facie case, unless it could demonstrate that the defendant 
possesses market power as a result of the transaction—a prospect 
excluded by the facts.298 Even if the plaintiff could somehow establish 
that the defendant possesses market power, the defendant could 
nonetheless prevail by demonstrating that the restraint in fact reduced 
prices compared to the status quo ante.299 In short, the dominant rule of 
reason test, informed as it is by the partial equilibrium trade-off model, 
would produce accurate assessments of the impact of this form of 
integration. 
The impact of the second arrangement and its resulting fate under 
the current test is more difficult to trace. For one thing, the restraint in 
question does not exist in a vacuum, but is, instead, part of a larger effort 
to create and market a new product and significantly to alter the 
economic status quo ante. This effort will involve specific investments in 
creating and producing a new product, product differentiation, 
advertising expenditures (which also constitute specific investments), and 
the passage of time between investments and their expected payoff. 
Moreover, the investment and subsequent promotion of the new product 
create conditions that are ripe for opportunism, in this case free riding by 
rivals on the sunk promotional expenditures of other members of the 
venture.300 Finally, the transaction and the accompanying restraint have 
no impact on the engineering considerations that impact technological 
 
 296. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Williamson, Antitrust Defense, supra note 55, at 21; cf. Bain, supra note 31, at 357 
(describing how certain instances of vertical integration purportedly reduce technological production 
costs). 
 298. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that proof of 
market power is an alternate vehicle for establishing a prima facie case under the rule of reason); 
AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.31, at 12 (“In some cases, however, a determination of anticompetitive harm 
may be informed by a consideration of market power.”). 
 299. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984); AGCC, 
supra note 99, § 3.35, at 22 n.50. 
 300. Indeed, the district court in Topco found that unrestrained rivalry between venture members 
would result in such free riding. See 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1040–43 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
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production costs in the perfect competition model.301 Indeed, the whole 
point of the restraints is to alter background “rules of the game,” so as to 
induce venture partners to expend more resources on promotion—that 
is, to increase the overall venture’s technological unit cost of production 
and distribution when compared to the expenditures that would be in 
place before the restraint.302 Moreover, unlike the first transaction, which 
merely impacts the supply side of the market, by altering the costs of 
producing an unchanged product, these challenged restraints would also 
impact the demand side. By facilitating creation of a new product and 
inducing venture partners to make additional promotional investments, 
the restraints would attract new customers and induce current customers 
to purchase additional products from the manufacturer at a given price.303 
Economists model the impact of promotion and product differentiation 
as an outward shift in the demand schedule for the product in question, 
as well as a change in the slope of the curve to reflect less elastic 
demand.304 
By hypothesis, the venture creates a new product and thus, serves 
the interests of consumers.305 Moreover, the restraint encourages 
promotion of this product, which may compete with those sold by larger, 
completely integrated rivals, who achieve the same amount of promotion 
unilaterally.306 Nothing about this account depends upon the restraint 
inducing the exercise of market power, aside from that associated with 
product differentiation, which of course does not offend the antitrust 
laws.307 In short, this is the exact sort of conduct the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect and encourage, namely, economic integration 
 
 301. See supra notes 68, 165 and accompanying text (collecting authorities treating the production 
function as based upon “engineering considerations”). 
 302. Several scholars have recognized that beneficial vertical restraints such as exclusive territories 
will induce dealers bound by such agreements to incur additional costs of promotion and thus, to seek 
to increase the price they can charge for the product in question. See William F. Baxter, The Viability 
of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 933, 945–46 (1987); Telser, supra note 196, at 91; see 
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135, 156 
(1984) (“Every argument about restricted dealing implies that the restrictions influence price. There is 
no such thing as a free lunch; the manufacturer can’t get the dealer to do more without increasing the 
dealer’s margin.”); Meese, supra note 29, at 152–61 (applying this logic to horizontal restraints). 
 303. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 196, at 429–39; see also Meese, supra note 29, at 158–61 (explaining 
how such restraints can facilitate product differentiation). 
 304. See Telser, supra note 196, at 89–90 (portraying the impact of RPM in this manner). 
 305. Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–02 (1984) (holding that 
horizontal restraints that facilitate creation of differentiated product are properly analyzed under the 
rule of reason); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 13–16 (1979) (finding that 
restraint’s creation of a new product prevents summary condemnation). 
 306. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1035, 1039–41 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
 307. Cf. AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.36(a) (stating that agencies will not credit purported efficiencies 
requiring anticompetitive output reductions). 
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reallocating resources to facilitate interbrand competition and enhance 
society’s welfare.308 
Still, such a restraint would not survive scrutiny under the rule of 
reason standards articulated by most courts and the agencies. To begin 
with, the restraint apparently produces the sort of “actual detrimental 
effects” that give rise to a prima facie case, by resulting in higher prices 
and/or lower output when compared to the baseline that courts currently 
employ. If successful, the restraint will facilitate promotion and product 
differentiation and cause the price of the venture product to rise as 
compared to products sold by venture members before the venture. 
Moreover, once the venture begins selling the new product to its 
members, who in turn incur significant promotional expenses, 
subsequent removal of the restraint will increase short term rivalry 
between venture members and thus increase output and reduce prices, 
thereby suggesting that enforcement of the restraint increased prices and 
reduced output.309 Indeed, for some restraints, mere proof that the 
restraint exists would suffice to establish such a case.310 
Moreover, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a 
defendant can only prevail by showing that the restraint produces 
significant benefits that manifest themselves as prices that are lower than 
those that would exist without the restraint.311 However, the benefits of 
the restraint—encouraging promotion and product differentiation—will 
manifest themselves as higher prices compared to the baselines that 
courts and the agencies employ, quashing any effort to rebut the prima 
facie case.312 Thus, the current rule of reason framework, informed by the 
 
 308. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15–16 (1997) (noting that interbrand competition is the 
primary concern of antitrust); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100–02 (finding that a restraint’s facilitation of 
product differentiation is a redeeming virtue); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 
n.25 (1977) (noting that promotion of a differentiated product conveys useful information); see also 
Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction 
Cost Approach, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 987–88 (1979) (explaining how non-standard agreements that 
reduce transaction costs facilitate efficient allocation of resources). 
 309. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–08 (finding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case by 
“showing” that removal of the restraint would reduce prices). 
 310. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. Indeed, one former head of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice opined that the mere existence of a restraint such as the one 
posited here would itself establish a prima facie case. See Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, Address Before the 
American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program 5 & n.8 (Nov. 7, 
1996), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches. The former head of the Federal Trade 
Commission reached a similar result. See Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint 
Ventures, 74 Geo. L.J. 1605, 1621 (1986) (concluding that Topco restraints were properly condemned 
because defendants could have achieved the same objectives in a different manner). 
 311. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 312. Cf. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 (“If the NCAA’s television plan produced procompetitive 
efficiencies, the plan would increase output and reduce the price of televised games. The District 
Court’s contrary findings accordingly undermine petitioner’s position.”). 
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partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, would unambiguously condemn 
such restraints, which in fact create no harm and produce only benefits 
treated as cognizable under the antitrust laws. 
B. The Source of the Hostility 
What explains current law’s unjustified hostility toward certain 
restraints that reduce transaction costs? After all, both forms of vertical 
integration detailed above “reduce transaction costs.” Both do so by 
changing background rules—the institutional framework—to reduce the 
“cost” of relying upon atomistic markets to conduct economic activity.313 
By altering the framework in this way, both also alter the content of 
future activity and the resulting allocation of society’s resources.314 Both 
alter this content “for the better,” that is, they attenuate market failure 
so as to enhance the allocation of resources.315 Finally, antitrust courts 
have repeatedly stated that such benefits are cognizable, or with the 
result that a plausible claim that a restraint will produce them avoids per 
se condemnation.316 Nonetheless, as explained above, current law, 
informed as it is by the partial equilibrium trade-off model, would 
condemn one such restraint and others like it. 
There is, however, an important conceptual difference between 
these two restraints and the transactions they accompany, a difference 
that accounts for this disparate treatment. The “market failure” solved 
by the first restraint manifests itself in higher pre-transaction 
technological costs of discovery and haggling. This “failure” is no 
different in some sense from the “failure” that occurs when a firm elects 
to purchase inputs from a supplier with higher costs of producing the 
input than its own.317 Thus, a decision to abandon the market to reduce 
these transaction costs seems indistinguishable from the classic rationale 
for vertical integration recognized by price theory’s partial equilibrium 
trade-off model, namely, the realization of technical economies that alter 
the firm’s production function as compared to the status quo ante.318 
 
 313. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 176, at 715–17. 
 314. Id. at 717–18 (explaining how a contractual or legal change in background rules can alter the 
content of economic activity). 
 315. See Baxter, supra note 302, at 947–48 (arguing that vertical restraints overcome market 
failures and enhance the allocation of resources); Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 32, at 68 
(arguing that non-standard contracts are often essential to fostering competition); Meese, supra note 
29, at 134–41 (explaining how non-standard contracts can overcome market failure and improve 
welfare); Williamson, supra note 308, at 988–89 (“Organizational changes that give rise to [transaction 
costs savings] will, if not accompanied by offsetting price distortions, invariably yield social gains.”). 
 316. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–57 (1976). 
 317. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text; see also Dahlman, supra note 191, at 144–46. 
 318. See Bain, supra note 31, at 357; Stigler, The Theory of Price, supra note 211, at 168–71 
(referring to Stigler, Division of Labor, supra note 211); see also Kaysen & Turner, supra note 31, at 
128–29 (noting that a merger can alter the extent of vertical integration to account for technological 
changes); supra note 173 and accompanying text (detailing classic technological account of vertical 
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This first class of efficiencies finds easy recognition within the price-
theoretic merger trade-off paradigm and the doctrinal framework that 
this paradigm informs.319 To be precise, such restraints purport to alter 
only one variable as compared to the equilibrium status quo ante, 
namely, the cost of identifying and bargaining with an input supplier.320 
The restraints do not depend upon or accompany relationship-specific 
investments or other efforts to differentiate a firm’s product. Moreover, 
such restraints do not contemplate promotional efforts to enhance 
consumers’ demand for the newly-differentiated product. While such 
restraints do overcome a sort of “market failure,” the failure does not, as 
do various forms of opportunism, manifest itself as a pre-restraint 
disequilibrium, that is, specific investments without safeguards against 
opportunism.321 
In these circumstances, then, the price charged by the defendants 
before the adoption of the restraint can serve as a useful baseline for 
assessing the impact of a restraint that purports to reduce these 
transaction costs. It makes perfect sense to treat the equilibrium price 
that existed before the restraint as “competitive,” or at least as 
competitive as antitrust regulation can expect, namely, workably 
competitive.322 Moreover, in those cases in which one cannot determine 
the pre-restraint price, it makes sense for a court simply to perform a 
straightforward thought experiment—that is, to ask whether, after 
consummation of the transaction, the defendants would charge a lower 
or higher price if the transaction were reversed.323 If removal of the 
restraint would increase prices, such an increase would indicate that 
 
integration). 
 319. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (explaining how the merger trade-off example 
served as a paradigm informing antitrust policy). 
 320. Cf. Bain, supra note 54, at 14–15 (explaining that price theory “does not investigate very well 
the implications of changing determinants” of different equilibria and economic performance). 
 321. Cf. Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants, supra note 256, at 356–57 (explaining that 
opportunistic exploitation of relationship–specific investments “is not a long-run equilibrium 
phenomenon”); see also infra notes 356–58 and accompanying text (explaining how pre-restraint prices 
do not always constitute an equilibrium relevant to antitrust analysis, where the restraint prevents 
opportunism). 
 322. Cf. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 (10th Cir. 1998) (assuming implicitly that a price 
existing before the restraint was competitive in this sense); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 
667, 673–74 (7th Cir. 1992) (same). As Oliver Williamson noted, application of the partial equilibrium 
trade-off model to mergers does not require assumption that pre-merger prices were perfectly 
competitive. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
699, 712 (1977) (“[M]erging parties’ possession of] [p]reexisting market power . . . may be introduced 
easily into the basic model.”); cf. id. at 706–07 & n.25 (explaining that the basic model assumes that 
merging firms are duopolists, and that threat of entry keeps pre-merger prices at a competitive level). 
 323. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104–09 (1984) (relying 
upon the district court’s finding that removal of challenged restraints would reduce prices and increase 
output); see also id. at 89–90 (recounting how parties had adopted similar restraints in the early 1950s 
and enforced them throughout). 
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lower transaction costs more than offset any market power effects, while 
a lower price upon removal would indicate that the restriction created 
power that overwhelmed any efficiencies.324 Thus, while these restraints 
produce benefits supposedly not recognized by workable competition’s 
trade-off model, that model in fact has no difficulty recognizing and 
incorporating such efficiencies within its central tool for evaluating trade 
practices.325 Like Newtonian mechanics, which produces useful results 
despite unrealistic assumptions, the partial equilibrium trade-off model 
can evaluate restraints that reduce certain forms of transaction costs, 
even while modeling them as changes in technology.326 
By contrast, the second sort of arrangement produces non-
technological efficiencies.327 These restraints have no impact on the 
underlying “engineering” cost of production. Moreover, such restraints 
do not arise in a vacuum, but accompany larger efforts to improve the 
economic status quo ante by manipulating variables other than the cost of 
production. For instance, as assumed above, such a restraint might 
accompany investments designed to alter the product the defendants 
were selling before the restraint.328 Indeed, such restraints may 
themselves facilitate and encourage the creation of a new product, as 
when members of a college sports league agree among themselves not to 
pay student-athletes a salary, thereby preserving the amateur quality of 
the product.329 Moreover, such restraints often facilitate promotional 
efforts that alter consumer preferences and shift the demand schedule for 
the defendants’ product and alter its slope.330 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the various specific investments that such restraints 
 
 324. See id. at 114 (noting that the district court’s finding that restraints resulted in prices higher 
than those that would exist without them undermined defendants’ claim of benefits). 
 325. Cf. Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 78 (explaining how the incumbent 
paradigm resists challenges by adjusting itself through “numerous articulations and ad hoc 
modifications” to incorporate seemingly contradictory evidence). 
 326. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1706 (1986) 
(“Newton’s model of gravitation assumes a perfect vacuum. There aren’t any perfect vacuums in this 
universe, but the model is still pretty useful—and it is useful even though Einstein showed it to be 
wrong. Newtonian dynamics, flawed as they are, give very good approximations for practical use by 
people sending Voyager 2 to Neptune or baseballs to home plate.”). 
 327. See supra Parts II.B (defining and discussing “technological transaction costs”) and II.C 
(defining non-technological transaction costs). 
 328. See supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (stating that 
contractual restrictions on horizontal rivalry were necessary to differentiate the NCAA’s product from 
minor league sports); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (finding that defendants would not 
have formed their venture without assurance provided by exclusive territories). 
 329. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100–02 (1984) (holding that horizontal agreement on players’ salaries 
would avoid summary condemnation because unbridled rivalry would result in the degeneration of 
“amateur” football, associated with an academic tradition, to the equivalent of semi-pro football); 
Meese, supra note 29, at 158. 
 330. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports, 961 F.2d at 675–76. 
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accompany require the passage of time, thereby enhancing the risk of 
opportunism.331 Such opportunism takes place when property rights are 
poorly specified, thereby providing incentives for some parties to exploit 
investments made by others, resulting in a disequilibrium allocation of 
resources, at least in the short run.332 
The absence of well-specified property rights is itself a departure 
from the assumptions of perfect and workable competition.333 Such 
restraints survive per se condemnation precisely because they may 
overcome the sort of market failure that poorly-specified property rights 
may induce.334 By changing background rules, the restraints help create 
the well-defined property rights that perfect and workable competition 
assume in the first place, a right in the fruits of members’ promotional 
expenditures.335 The existence of the rights will, of course, encourage 
promotion—a form of output—thereby facilitating product 
differentiation.336 Indeed, it may even encourage the formation of the 
venture in the first place.337 Thus, this second type of restraint has no 
impact on the technological costs of production, but instead, helps alter 
what firms choose to produce, how much they choose to promote it, and 
what consumers choose to buy.338 
 
 331. See, e.g., id. at 673–75 (explaining how the restraint accompanied the league’s successful 
multi-year effort to enhance the attractiveness of its product vis à vis other entertainment and how, in 
1980 and 1981, the league was so unpopular that the league championship was only televised on tape 
delay). 
 332. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. Econ. 
Hist. 16, 22–25 (1973) (describing how a system of private property can transform a communal good 
characterized by underproduction into a private good); Demsetz, supra note 263, at 348–49 (discussing 
how well-defined property rights cause owners to internalize the social costs and benefits of their 
actions). 
 333. See Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 11–15 (2d ed. 1997); see also 
Hayek, supra note 47, at 110–11 (“That a functioning market presupposes not only prevention of 
violence and fraud but the protection of certain rights, such as property, and the enforcement of 
contracts, is always taken for granted.”). 
 334. See supra notes 87–94, 314–16 and accompanying text (explaining how restraints survive per 
se condemnation for this reason). 
 335. See Bork, supra note 251, at 956 (suggesting that RPM confers the equivalent of property 
rights on dealers); Meese, supra note 250, at 595–607; cf. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Common Law 
of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis 252–53 (1986) (explaining that restrictive 
covenants enable business owners to realize the benefits of expected returns from investment in 
goodwill in the sale price of a business, by granting limited property rights in these assets to the 
purchaser). 
 336. See supra notes 244–52 and accompanying text; see also Robert H. Bork, A Reply to 
Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 Yale L.J. 731, 733–34 (1967) (discussing how promotional 
expenditures are indistinguishable from other forms of output). 
 337. See Meese, supra note 29, at 158 (explaining how the availability of efficient distribution 
devices may encourage firms to create and market new products). 
 338. See Bork, supra note 336, at 733–34 (describing how promotion can differentiate a product); 
Meese, supra note 29, at 158–60 (explaining how such non-standard contracts can facilitate product 
differentiation). 
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Given these characteristics of restraints that produce non-
technological efficiencies, it should come as no surprise that the test 
applied under current law—based upon the partial equilibrium trade-off 
model—does not accurately appraise the impact of such restraints. Recall 
that the partial equilibrium model assumes well-specified property rights, 
production of an unchanged product, instantaneous market equilibria, 
constant demand for the defendants’ product, and the absence of 
opportunism and other externalities. The model also assumes that only 
the state can eliminate externalities, via state ownership or 
rearrangement of state-created property rights.339 In this way, the model 
exemplifies Joe Bain’s observation, consistent with Frank Knight’s 
definition of perfect competition, that price theory investigates mainly 
“what performance would be with some given and fixed set of 
determinants, after some sort of stable balance or regular pattern of 
behavior has been reached in a given situation” and thus, does not 
“investigate very much the implications of changing determinants.”340 At 
most the model recognizes two sorts of changes: economies of scale and 
enhanced market power. 
Take current law’s methods of determining whether a restraint 
results in “actual detrimental effects.”341 Under one of these methods, 
courts take a historical approach, asking whether the defendants’ prices 
are higher, or output is lower, after the restraint than they were 
beforehand, without adjusting prices, or output, for product quality.342 
This approach—entirely consistent with the partial equilibrium model—
assumes that price and output charged before the imposition of the 
restraint reflected an equilibrium and that demand for the product 
remains constant before and after the restraint.343 In this scenario, a new 
equilibrium of higher prices, or lower output, would readily indicate that 
the restraint facilitates the collective exercise of market power. Other 
explanations have been excluded by hypothesis. 
However, the assumptions that undergird the application of the 
partial equilibrium model make no sense in this context. Once a 
defendant offers a plausible claim that a restraint produces non-
technological efficiencies, there is no reason to assume that the pre-
restraint price reflects a non-harmful or “competitive” benchmark the 
exceeding of which indicates an exercise of market power. Instead, it 
 
 339. See Meese, supra note 68, at 80 (stating that during the inhospitality era, economists assumed 
that only legal reform, and not market contracting, would overcome market failure and thus, 
externalities). 
 340. See Bain, supra note 54, at 14; see also Knight, supra note 35, at 79 (stating that the perfect 
competition model assumes that “given factors and conditions are . . . to remain absolutely 
unchanged”). 
 341. See supra notes 102, 126 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra notes 102–03, 126 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 56, 102–03, 126 and accompanying text. 
Meese_62-HLJ-457.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:18 PM 
December 2010]   REFRAMING ANTITRUST 515 
seems just as plausible to assume that the pre-restraint price reflects a 
non-optimal combination of product quality, promotion, or both, as well 
as externalities, that is, a risk of opportunism.344 In these circumstances, 
one could say that, contrary to assumptions undergirding price theory, 
the restraint will change state-created background rules. This change will 
improve upon imperfect property rights, which in turn will facilitate a 
joint venture and associated promotion that will reallocate resources and 
thereby alter the content of economic activity, as compared to the pre-
restraint baseline embraced by the partial equilibrium trade-off model. 
Thus, any apparent “increase” in price would have absolutely nothing to 
do with the collective exercise of market power, but would instead reflect 
a new, more efficient equilibrium brought about by the venture, product 
differentiation, and the accompanying restraint.345 
What, however, about the other method of determining the impact 
of a restraint on prices or output—namely a thought experiment whereby 
the tribunal simply asks whether, if the restraint were removed, the 
defendants’ price would fall and output would rise?346 Such a hypothetical 
reduction in price and increase in output would indicate that imposition 
and enforcement of the restraint caused higher prices and reduced 
output. This approach would seem superior to a simple comparison of 
pre- and post-restraint prices, since this latter approach controls for 
specific investments, product differentiation, and promotion by ignoring 
pre-restraint prices. Thus, it would seem, such an approach to 
determining actual detrimental effects will isolate the impact upon price 
or output, and any market power effects, of the restraint itself, thereby 
correcting for the shortcomings of the historical approach. 
Nonetheless, closer analysis reveals the flaw in this latter approach 
that produces the erroneous results described earlier. The outcome of a 
thought experiment is only as good as the implicit model that informs it. 
Here, that model suffers from various shortcomings that undermine the 
results of any thought experiment that relies upon it. Assume that the 
venture and the accompanying restraints have their intended impact, 
namely, specific investments in product creation and promotion, as well 
as a differentiated, well-promoted product. Assume that, subsequently, 
the parties involuntarily drop the restraint. Venture members will invade 
each others’ former territories, enhancing rivalry in the sale of venture 
products.347 Such rivalry will reduce prices and increase output. To the 
tribunal schooled in “rudimentary economics” and the application of the 
 
 344. See Meese, supra note 29, at 146–48. 
 345. See supra notes 41, 82–86 and accompanying text (explaining how product differentiation 
does not offend the antitrust laws and, in fact, benefits consumers). 
 346. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 105–06 (1984). 
 347. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (assuming that restraint’s 
removal would have such an effect, even if “members may indeed ‘cut each other’s throats’”). 
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partial equilibrium paradigm, these changes in price and output would 
reflect the natural impact of competition tempering an exercise of market 
power—a movement from an anticompetitive equilibrium, imposed by the 
restraint, to a non-restraint equilibrium that is more “competitive.”348 
Judged against this purportedly “competitive” baseline, then, the restraint 
apparently exercises market power and harms consumers. 
This tribunal would be wrong. Instead of reflecting the salutary 
impact of competition upon market power, the price reduction imagined 
by this thought experiment would instead reflect inefficient opportunistic 
behavior by firms entering their partners’ erstwhile exclusive territories. 
Nothing in the scenario hypothesized depended upon a market structure 
conferring market power upon the defendants, even after the venture. 
Moreover, the restraint by hypothesis induced expenditures that, by their 
nature, would be sunk, that is, not useful in connection with other 
economic endeavors.349 Finally, these expenditures would differentiate 
the product and enhance consumer demand, resulting in higher prices. 
A firm that entered a partner’s exclusive territories after removal of 
a restraint would presumably abjure promotional expenditures, choosing 
instead to exploit the incumbent’s sunk promotional investments, free 
riding on those expenditures already made.350 The new entrant could thus 
profitably underprice the incumbent, forcing it to match the prices 
charged by the entrant to remain in the marketplace. While the 
incumbent would suffer an accounting loss “on paper,” such prices would 
minimize its losses, given that the costs of promotion are sunk and thus, 
independent of the incumbent’s price or output.351 Removal of the 
restraint would thereby result in higher output and reduced prices for the 
venture product, at least in the short run. Once the entrant has fully 
exploited the incumbent’s promotional investments, however, the 
incumbent will refuse to make additional investments of the same sort.352 
Moreover, the entrant itself will also refuse to make such investments. 
As a result, demand for the venture’s product will fall over the longer 
run, both output and prices will fall, and the entire venture may become 
unprofitable and shut down. 
Thus, while removal of the restraint would reduce the defendant’s 
prices and increase output, thereby suggesting that the restraint itself 
increases prices and reduces output, this prediction would not suggest 
 
 348. Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (explaining that courts should rely 
upon “a rudimentary understanding of economics” when determining whether a restraint, on its face, 
establishes a prima facie case). 
 349. See Klein, supra note 196, at 298–300 (describing the connection between sunk costs and 
opportunism). 
 350. Cf. Telser, supra note 196, at 87–91. 
 351. Klein et al., supra note 196, at 299 (explaining how reducing prices below sunk costs will not 
reduce the exploited party’s output). 
 352. See Telser, supra note 196, at 91. 
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that the restraint constitutes an exercise of market power, that is, the 
ability to raise price above cost by restricting output.353 Instead, higher 
prices associated with the restraint could just as well reflect the cost of 
additional, efficient promotion induced by the agreement.354 Nor would 
the price reduction or output increase imagined by the thought 
experiment be “pro-competitive.” Instead, the price reduction or output 
increase would reflect rivals’ opportunistic exploitation of product-
specific promotional investment and below-cost pricing by the defendant. 
The prevention of such exploitation is, by hypothesis, the rationale for 
rejecting per se condemnation in favor of rule of reason treatment in the 
first place.355 Far from reflecting a more “competitive” price and output 
than that produced by the restraint, then, such exploitation and resulting 
lower price is the result of two departures from perfect (and workable) 
competition: the poor specification of property rights and opportunistic 
behavior—an externality— by venture members.356 This state of affairs is 
not an equilibrium or a stable solution that can provide a valid baseline 
against which to measure the effects of the restraint for antitrust 
purposes.357 Instead of reflecting a “competitive” or optimal mix of 
economic variables, analogous to the workably “competitive” market 
that animates the partial equilibrium trade-off model, this baseline 
reflects an unsustainable combination of price, output, and promotion.358 
The “thought experiment” method of implementing current law 
ignores specific investments, product differentiation, and possible 
opportunism—all non-technological departures from perfect 
competition. As a result, this method improperly interprets the imagined 
price reduction and output increase following removal of the restraint as 
evidence that the agreement enhances defendant’s market power and 
produces prices and output that are “anticompetitive” compared to that 
 
 353. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981) (examining definition and measurement of market power relevant for 
antitrust law). 
 354. See Meese, supra note 29, at 150–51. 
 355. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51–57 (1977) (holding that the 
propensity of a restraint to reduce opportunistic free riding is a cognizable benefit, saving the restraint 
from per se condemnation). 
 356. Cf. Knight, supra note 35, at 78–79 (explaining that perfect competition model assumes that 
individuals do not “prey upon” one another); Bowles & Gintis, supra note 69, at 84 (contending that 
price theory and the perfect competition model rested upon assumption that all market actors behaved 
as “Victorian gentlemen”); Makowski & Ostroy, supra note 69, at 490–91 (detailing the tendency of 
some devotees of perfect competition to assume away possibility of opportunism by fiat). 
 357. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (explaining how the partial equilibrium trade-off 
model assumes that pre-merger prices and output reflect stable equilibrium free of externality and 
market failure). 
 358. See Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants, supra note 256, at 357 (explaining that 
opportunistic exploitation of relationship-specific investments “is not a long-run equilibrium 
phenomenon”); Langlois, supra note 47, at 11–12. 
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which would occur upon removal of the restraint.359 In point of fact, 
however, the non-restraint baseline that is supposedly more 
“competitive” is entirely illusory—a state of affairs that parties would not 
rationally have chosen in the first place, because the imagined prices and 
output do not reflect the costs of production and associated promotion 
anticipated by the joint venture.360 Parties’ failure to achieve this 
inefficient non-equilibrium combination of price and output is not a 
“harm” for antitrust purposes, any more than a firm’s failure to price 
below cost.361 Internalization of an externality sometimes leads to higher 
prices, and the Sherman Act does not require firms to adopt practices 
that maintain externality and destroy wealth. Measurement and 
“observation” are of little use if one does not know what one is looking 
for, or simply asks the wrong question.362 
Take, now, the manner in which courts evaluate a defendant’s 
argument that its restraint produces efficiencies that overcome the harm 
presumed once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, in whatever 
manner. Under current law, such an argument can only succeed if the 
tribunal determines that, in fact, the restraint results in prices that are 
lower, or at least no higher, than those that would exist without the 
restraint.363 Indeed, courts have even gone so far as to hold that a 
purported benefit is not even cognizable unless it tends to reduce prices 
below the non-restraint level.364 This is the very same approach that 
courts currently take in the merger context.365 
Such an approach would make perfect sense if defendants were 
claiming that their restraints produced technological efficiencies in an 
otherwise workably competitive market. In such cases the impact of a 
restraint upon price would signal whether efficiencies outweighed market 
 
 359. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that rule of reason analysis is premised 
on a search for exercise of market power that harms consumers). 
 360. Cf. supra notes 334–38 and accompanying text (explaining how some restraints can allow 
parties to capture the benefits of promotional investments and thereby increase promotional 
expenditures). 
 361. See generally Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal, 73 Antitrust L.J. 81 
(2005) (arguing that the Sherman Act does not require monopolists to sell output to rivals below cost); 
cf. Hayek, supra note 47, at 100 (asserting that economists should judge the impact of real world 
rivalry by comparing results to those that could actually be obtained under alternative arrangements). 
 362.  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science, in The 
Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 178, 213 [hereinafter Kuhn, The Function of Measurement] 
(contending that “‘[g]o ye forth and measure’ may well prove only an invitation to waste time,” 
because “fruitful quantification” depends upon theoretical apparatus telling scientists what to look 
for); id. at 193 (theory tells scientists what quantifiable facts to look for); see also Karl Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery 88 (Routledge Classics, 2002) (1959) (stating that true science needs a 
theoretical “point[] of view” to drive and inform its fact gathering). 
 363. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1983); AGCC, 
supra note 99, § 3.37. 
 364. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978). 
 365. See Joint Merger Guidelines, supra note 120, § 4.0. 
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power effects to purchasers’ benefit. However, the markets in question 
emphatically do not satisfy these assumptions, given the presence of 
specific investments, poorly-specified property rights, opportunism-
related externalities, and market failure. Thus, the restraint produces 
efficiencies that may manifest themselves as prices higher, and output 
lower, than the pre-restraint baseline, or the price, or output, that would 
obtain after removal of the restraint. 
C. The Persistence of the Partial Equilibrium Paradigm 
Current law’s continuing failure properly to consider non-
technological transaction costs may seem surprising. After all, the 
Supreme Court recognized that non-standard agreements can produce 
such “redeeming virtues” three decades ago, in the Sylvania decision.366 
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly invoked the prospect of such 
benefits to justify their refusal to declare various restraints unlawful per 
se.367 Why, then, have these same actors simultaneously adopted a 
method of rule of reason analysis destined to condemn so many of these 
restraints? 
For one thing, successful paradigms and the “mental sets” they 
embody are persistent and resist change; such resistance is part of their 
strength.368 Scientists, including social scientists, do not lightly abandon 
an analytical apparatus that has served them well, by illuminating and 
solving problems the discipline deems important.369 The partial 
equilibrium trade-off model and workable competition theory have 
served industrial organization and antitrust well, by illuminating and 
helping to solve a variety of antitrust problems by producing, or at least 
suggesting, workable rules to address issues such as product 
differentiation, mergers, internal expansion by monopolists, and 
economies of scale in concentrated industries.370 Finally, Williamson’s 
 
 366. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–57 (1977). 
 367. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 368. See Kuhn, The Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 225; id. at 232 (“[A] more flexible practice 
will not produce the pattern of rapid consequential scientific advance to which recent centuries have 
accustomed us. . . . Except under quite special circumstances, the practitioner of a mature science does 
not pause to examine the divergent modes of explanation or experimentation.”); id. at 229 (explaining 
how training that solidifies paradigms creates “mental sets” or “Einstellungen”); see also Kuhn, 
Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 76–79 (entrenched paradigms resist change). 
 369. See Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 76 (“So long as the tools a paradigm 
supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and 
penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in 
manufacture so in science—retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands 
it.”); id. (adding that such retooling only occurs when there is a genuine scientific crisis); Kuhn, The 
Function of Measurement, supra note 362, at 208–09 (noting that scientists cling to theories to which 
they are committed as long as possible). 
 370. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text; see also Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra 
note 58, at 23 (“Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in 
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formalization of the model in the late 1960s, complete with a simple 
graphical visualization, made the model and its conclusions accessible to 
a much wider audience, facilitating its application by legal scholars and 
practitioners.371 
Moreover, as explained earlier, Coase’s classic example of 
transaction costs—bargaining and information costs—were closely 
analogous to the sort of costs recognized by the partial equilibrium 
paradigm.372 Scholars outside the context of industrial organization and 
antitrust defined “transaction costs” in the same way, without reference 
to opportunism or even integration.373 Thus, an enthusiastic recognition 
that integration could reduce transaction costs did not, on its face, call 
into question the utility of the partial equilibrium trade-off model, or the 
antitrust tests that it spawned. 
Even subsequent expansions of the transaction cost concept by 
other scholars did not undermine any of the core conclusions of the 
trade-off model or workable competition, neither of which had arisen to 
evaluate non-standard agreements. It was Oliver Williamson, after all, a 
modern proponent of TCE, who also refined the trade-off paradigm as a 
vehicle for analyzing mergers that produce technological efficiencies.374 
TCE offered new explanations for agreements that workable 
competition had explained as expressions of market power.375 These 
explanations entered the antitrust policy debate during the same period 
that scholars and policymakers expressed growing appreciation of the 
propensity of mergers and internal expansion to generate efficiencies via 
economies of scale, a propensity clarified by Williamson’s 
formalization.376 Moreover, given the state of the law in the mid-1960s, 
when scholars began to rediscover Coase’s insight and to identify new 
transaction costs, the main question before the courts and scholars was 
whether to expand or contract the scope of various per se rules.377 
Scholars and appellate courts could answer this question without 
 
solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”). 
 371. See sources cited supra note 60; see also Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381, 385–88 (1980) (invoking Williamson’s 
partial equilibrium model to illustrate the possible trade-off between efficiency losses and gains in 
merger to monopoly). 
 372. See supra notes 199–210 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 374. Williamson, Antitrust Defense, supra note 55. 
 375. See supra notes 180–98, 228–73. 
 376. See Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 89, at 273 (“[During the 1970s] the social 
benefits of efficient resource allocation—to include the importance of [technological] economies as an 
antitrust defense—became much more widely appreciated.”). 
 377. See, e.g., Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983) (delimiting the 
scope of the per se rule against minimum RPM). 
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determining how to conduct rule of reason analysis, which they often left 
to trial courts and juries on remand.378 
Courts and scholars did turn to the content of rule of reason analysis 
in the early 1980s, just a few years after transaction cost analysis achieved 
its status as a competing paradigm for analyzing the antitrust implications 
of partial and complete integration.379 At the same time, decisions 
declaring partial integration subject to rule of reason analysis suggested 
that any benefits produced by such restraints coexisted with 
anticompetitive effects.380 It should come as no surprise, then, that 
scholars constructing standards for conducting rule of reason analysis 
would turn to (and extend) the very same paradigm used to evaluate 
mergers, oligopolistic concentration, and unilateral expansion by 
monopolists, a paradigm that readily handled transactions that both 
enhanced market power and produced efficiencies.381 While application 
of these standards produced anomalies and puzzles of the sort described 
earlier, some lower courts have managed to avoid incorrect results by 
adopting ad hoc modifications of the standard approach, thereby staving 
off a crisis of confidence in the trade-off paradigm and slowing the 
emergence of an alternative.382 
Moreover, post-TCE decisions that reached the Supreme Court did 
not provide useful vehicles for recognizing the impact of TCE’s insights 
upon the partial equilibrium paradigm. One case, for instance, involved a 
restraint that avoided per se condemnation, because it reduced 
bargaining and information costs, costs analogous to the sort of 
 
 378. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (remanding 
without explaining how to conduct rule of reason analysis); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–36 (1979) (affirming the lower court’s application of the rule of reason to 
intrabrand restraint without elaborating on content of such analysis); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc. 433 U.S. 36 passim (1977) (same). 
 379. Dating the emergence of TCE as a competing paradigm would seem to be an inexact science. 
It seems safe to say, however, that the paradigm had fully emerged by 1980, if not before. Between 
1974 and 1980, for instance, several scholarly publications expressly applied the transaction cost 
approach to discern the causes of complete and partial vertical integration. See, e.g., Williamson, 
Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 239; Williamson, Economics of Antitrust, supra note 89; Klein, 
Transaction Cost Determinants, supra note 256; Klein et al., supra note 196. 
 380. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (explaining that courts conduct rule of reason analysis by 
“weighing” various variables bearing on the impact of the restraint); id. at 57 n.27 (asserting that 
courts can properly “balance” a restraint’s impact on intrabrand competition against the impact on 
interbrand competition). 
 381. See Kuhn, The Essential Tension, supra note 58, at 233 (“[M]uch of the research undertaken 
within a scientific tradition . . . [consists of] the extension of existing theory to areas that it is expected 
to cover but in which it has never before been tried.”); see also supra notes 55–62 and accompanying 
text. 
 382. See Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, supra note 58, at 78 (noting that a paradigm’s 
practitioners adopt ad hoc modifications conforming theory with inconvenient facts); id. at 76 (opining 
that practitioners only retool useful paradigms when crisis demands it); see also supra notes 141–46 
and accompanying text (detailing efforts by lower courts to avoid implications of straightforward 
application of standard model). 
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technological production costs already recognized by the partial 
equilibrium model.383 Another involved an assertion that purchasers 
could not be trusted to make tradeoffs between price and quality, a 
benefit the Court properly rejected as non-cognizable.384 Finally, in 
NCAA, the Court rejected per se condemnation of the challenged 
restraints on price and output, without identifying any particular 
redeeming virtues the restraints might create.385 Thus, the Court’s 
ensuing rule of reason analysis did not have to confront any assertion 
that the restraint produced non-technological efficiencies.386 While the 
Court has addressed numerous vertical restraints that could produce 
non-technological benefits, it has in each such case simply rejected per se 
condemnation without attempting to conduct its own rule of reason 
analysis.387 Given the stickiness of paradigms, these cases did not result in 
the sort of anomaly-driven crisis that would lead to a repudiation of the 
partial equilibrium framework. Litigants hoping to undermine the 
current test must select and frame cases in a manner that squarely 
presents the conflict between the trade-off paradigm and the lessons of 
TCE. 
Finally, the law’s erroneous analysis of restraints that reduce non-
technological transaction costs likely flows from the intuitive assumption 
that a restraint that reduces transaction costs, or otherwise produces 
benefits, will tend to reduce prices when compared to a world with no 
such restraint. This intuition flows naturally from price theory’s so-called 
partial equilibrium trade-off model, discussed earlier.388 Nor has it 
helped, in this respect, that prominent scholarly advocates of the 
transaction cost approach have incorrectly invoked “price theory” in 
support of their arguments.389 It should come as no surprise, then, that 
generalist judges, for instance, have clung to a seemingly straightforward 
 
 383. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20–21. 
 384. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–97 (1978). 
 385. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–13 (rejecting per se 
condemnation of restraints before the Court, because certain restraints not before the Court were 
necessary to make the venture function). 
 386. See id. at 104–20. 
 387. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007); Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 722–26 (1979); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977); see also 
William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust, Injury 
and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1221 (1989) (arguing that antitrust doctrine had evolved 
gradually in the previous decades by, inter alia, gradual revision in the scope of per se rules). 
 388. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (describing partial equilibrium model and its 
application to antitrust problems). 
 389. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (explaining that Richard Posner and Robert Bork 
claimed that proper antitrust analysis of non-standard agreements rested on “basic price theory”). 
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price-based standard that purports to identify instances in which 
restraints harm consumers.390 
IV.  Reframing Rule of Reason Analysis 
What, then, is the proper baseline from which to analyze restraints 
that purport to reduce non-technological transaction costs? To answer 
this question, it is useful to return to the example considered—but not 
published—by Coase in 1932, that of a supplier that makes relationship-
specific investments to satisfy unique demands of a particular customer.391 
Coase opined that the supplier may fear that, after the investment, the 
customer might switch suppliers, or threaten to do so as a way of 
exploiting the relationship-specific investments.392 Such exploitation, of 
course, would take the form of the customer’s demand that the supplier 
reduce the price of the input, perhaps even below the supplier’s total unit 
costs. As a result, a supplier contemplating a relationship-specific 
investment would minimize the expected cost of producing the good in 
question, if it could obtain some assurance through partial or complete 
integration that the customer would not take its business elsewhere, but 
would instead deal exclusively with the supplier.393 Or, viewed from the 
customer’s perspective, purchasing the new input on the “open market,” 
free from contractual restraint, would entail a higher price than purchase 
pursuant to some sort of restraint.394 The purchaser could also minimize 
these costs if it integrated backwards and thereby took on the task of 
supplying its own needs.395 
Courts employing a partial equilibrium approach when evaluating 
such agreements would ask whether removal of the restraint would result 
in a lower price, thereby suggesting that enforcement of the restraint 
results in market power. Given the manner in which courts conduct this 
analysis, removal of the restraint “midstream” would in fact appear to 
reduce prices, as purchasers exploited the seller’s sunk investments by 
demanding price cuts, thus giving rise to a prima facie case.396 Moreover, 
even if a defendant could demonstrate that the restraint produces 
benefits, such benefits would not manifest themselves as reduced prices, 
 
 390. See Howard Margolis, Paradigms & Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific 
Beliefs 29–42 (1993) (arguing that entrenched mental habits based on common perceptions can 
constitute “barriers” preventing scientists from recognizing superior paradigms). 
 391. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13. 
 392. Id. at 12. 
 393. Id. at 13; see also Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–302 (making a similar point well before 
publication of Coase’s 1932 correspondence). 
 394. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 12–13. 
 395. Id. at 13 (“[T]he risks inherent in this condition of bilateral monopoly may make the capital` 
costs so high that it is cheaper for the original consuming firm to produce [inputs] itself even though 
the actual operating efficiency is less.”). 
 396. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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but would instead tend to increase prices as compared to the status quo 
ante. Current law would thus condemn a restraint that in fact enhanced 
consumer welfare.  
There is, however, another approach to consider, involving a 
baseline that requires a different thought experiment. Courts evaluating 
such a restraint could imagine a state of affairs—and resulting prices, 
quality, and output—that would obtain if the supplier incurred the cost 
of the hypothesized specific investment and produced the resulting 
differentiated product, but did not employ a non-standard contract to 
safeguard its specific investment through some degree of exclusivity. In 
this world, the supplier would incur both the cost of the new equipment 
and the transaction cost due to the resulting risk of customer 
opportunism.397 As a result, the supplier would charge more, and produce 
less, than it would if it could restrain the purchasing decisions of its 
customer by contract. 
Conducted against this baseline, the tests employed by the courts 
and enforcement agencies would work just fine. After all, partial or 
complete integration by a firm that has already made a specific 
investment that exposes it to opportunism will reduce the costs that the 
supplier will incur, increase its output, and reduce the price it will charge 
for the product produced with the new equipment.398 Thus, if our 
hypothetical supplier obtains some form of exclusivity from its customer, 
it will no longer face a prospect of opportunism that will induce it to 
charge a premium for the newly-differentiated product. Therefore, the 
firm’s prices will fall and output will rise “as a result of the restraint.”399 A 
test that focuses on the price charged by the defendant measured against 
the properly hypothesized baseline will therefore conclude that the 
restraint in question will, in fact, reduce prices. As a result, a plaintiff will 
not be able to establish a prima facie case against this sort of beneficial 
integration under this test. 
It should be noted that the baseline just described is not necessarily 
hypothetical. There may, for example, be instances in which a firm 
initially—and perhaps mistakenly—makes the specific investment in 
question, without simultaneously adopting a contractual safeguard. In 
these cases, the investing firm will suffer the relevant costs of 
opportunism after this investment and, in some cases anyway, will 
attempt to raise its prices accordingly to compensate for this risk. 
Moreover, if the firm then adopts a contractual safeguard, its costs will 
 
 397. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13 (explaining that specialized investment would raise 
the cost of capital absent some guarantee against opportunism). 
 398. See supra notes 230–38 and accompanying text. 
 399. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35 (asserting that a restraint reducing the prospect of 
opportunism will reduce the price charged by the proponent of the restraint); Coase, Origin, supra 
note 177, at 12–13 (same). 
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fall, and it may reduce its prices accordingly. Indeed, the prospect of such 
reduced prices would induce the firm’s trading partners to agree to the 
new safeguard in the first place.400 In cases such as this one, the status quo 
ante will be that situation in which the firm has made the specific 
investment without the safeguard, thereby exposing the firm to cost-
raising opportunism. The restraint in question will, therefore, actually 
reduce the costs that the firm incurs and thus may reduce the prices it 
charges consumers, with the result that current doctrine will achieve the 
correct result, it seems. 
Scenarios like the one just discussed will be less prevalent than one 
may initially think, however. For one thing, firms that are victims of 
unanticipated opportunism may not be able to raise their prices to reflect 
an exploitation of sunk costs, at least in the short run. Indeed, the 
paradigmatic example of opportunism that Coase invoked involved a 
purchaser’s demand that a supplier reduce its price below its total costs, 
some of which are sunk to the relationship in question.401 In these 
circumstances, the addition of a restraint will not reduce prices; it may 
even increase them, by depriving the customer of the ability to exploit 
the supplier by threatening to take its business elsewhere. Moreover, if 
opportunism has forced the supplier to keep its price down, it is not clear 
how the supplier will then be able to induce its opportunistic trading 
partners to agree to such a provision. 
In any event, a specific investment without a contractual safeguard 
and the resulting high price will not constitute an equilibrium and thus is 
not likely to occur in the “real world.” Like price theory, transaction cost 
economics depends upon the assumption that market participants, 
including our hypothetical purchaser and supplier, are rational and 
forward looking.402 As such, these participants will at least attempt to 
anticipate the sort of opportunism that can follow specific investments 
and, where possible, will guard against such behavior via complete or 
partial integration.403 Indeed, firms that devise methods of combating 
such opportunism will thrive vis à vis those that do not, regardless 
whether they know why they are thriving.404 Thus, it seems logical to 
 
 400. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 32–35; see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical 
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 145, 184–89 (1997) (explaining how a price 
differential can induce an agreement to a provision reducing opportunism). 
 401. See Coase, Origin, supra note 177, at 13; Klein et al., supra note 196, at 298–99. 
 402. See Williamson, supra note 66, at 44–46. 
 403. See Williamson, supra note 188, at 72 (“The main case to which transaction cost economics 
subscribes has been stated by Frank Knight as follows: ‘Men in general, and within limits, wish to 
behave economically, to make their activities and their organization ‘efficient’ rather than wasteful. 
This fact does deserve the utmost emphasis . . . .’” (citations omitted) (quoting Frank H. Knight, 
Anthropology and Economics, 53 J. Pol. Econ. 247, 252 (1941))). 
 404. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 211, 
216 (1950) (contending that firms that adopt optimal responses to their economic environment will 
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assume that most real world specific investments that expose the 
investing party to the prospect of opportunism will be accompanied, ex 
ante, by some mechanism, at least, that protects the investing firm from 
opportunism.405 Thus, in most cases examining non-standard contracts, 
courts will not be able to identify a real world baseline of price or output 
that accompanies pre-restraint specific investments. A legal test 
calibrated to evaluate conduct by irrational firms not likely to survive in 
the marketplace will not produce useful results. 
If parties, in fact, avoid opportunism by imposing certain restraints 
ex ante, then courts and enforcement agencies will have to construct a 
purely hypothetical baseline, that is, imagine a world in which the 
defendants make relationship-specific investments that give rise to 
product differentiation, but do not impose such a restraint. Having 
imagined such a world, the tribunal can compare the hypothetical non-
restraint price or output to that which accompanies the restraint. 
To determine whether the hypothesized price or output is higher or 
lower than that which actually prevails in the market place, a tribunal 
will have to predict the impact of the restraint based upon an assessment 
of its potential benefits and market power effects. The mere fact that 
such a restraint could produce such benefits does not mean that it will do 
so. At the same time, the mere fact that the restraint reduces or 
eliminates rivalry that would otherwise occur—in this scenario by 
preventing a customer from taking her business elsewhere—does not 
thereby establish anticompetitive harm. Nor, of course, would proof that 
the restraint produced higher prices, or reduced output as compared to 
the improper baselines employed by current law.406 Instead, courts would 
have to determine directly whether, given the structure of the 
marketplace (including the ease with which new firms may enter), the 
restraint in question could possibly enhance or protect market power of 
the parties to it.407 Moreover, if market structure is conducive to such 
 
survive and thrive relative to those that do not, even if they do not fully understand those conditions 
or know their particular practices are the optimal response to them); Coase, Nature of the Firm: 
Influence, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 33, 39–40 (1988) (noting that competition will induce firms to adopt the 
proper degree of contractual integration). 
 405. These mechanisms need not take the form of non-standard contracts subject to § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. See e.g., Williamson, supra note 66, at 47–48 (stating that firms can sometimes minimize 
the risk of opportunism by selecting trading partners with lower propensity of such behavior); Klein & 
Saft, supra note 256, at 348 & n.15 (describing a chain restaurant that established franchises in 
neighborhoods to increase repeat customers and reduce opportunism). 
 406. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text (describing baselines employed by current 
law). 
 407. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 216–21 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant’s small share of an unconcentrated market undermined plaintiff’s 
claim that the challenged restraint produced anticompetitive harm); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra 
note 136, at 253–67; see also AGCC, supra note 99, § 3.5 (articulating standards that enforcement 
agencies employ to determine whether entry by new firms may deter or prevent exercises of market power). 
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harm, tribunals would have to examine directly whether, in fact, the 
restraint produces the sort of benefits the defendant attributes to it, as 
well as the magnitude of such benefits. If the restraint does produce 
significant benefits, then tribunals would have no choice but to 
determine whether those benefits offset the harm identified at the first 
step. The results of this inquiry will, of course, replicate the results of an 
inquiry into whether the heightened risk of opportunism incurred 
without the restraint (the reframed baseline) would result in higher or 
lower prices than those associated with the restraint. In short, contrary to 
the approach that courts and agencies currently take, reframing rule of 
reason analysis along the lines suggested here would eliminate shortcuts 
and require courts to do the heavy lifting of determining whether, in fact, 
the restraint produces anticompetitive harm and, if so, whether that harm 
predominates. 
Conclusion 
Science employs tested paradigms to solve problems deemed 
important by the community, and economic science is no exception. For 
decades now, economists and legal scholars have employed workable 
competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off model to evaluate numerous 
practices governed by the Sherman Act. Moreover, application of this 
paradigm has produced useful evaluations of much conduct, including 
mergers and unilateral conduct, such as expansion that both realizes 
economies of scale and creates or fortifies monopoly power. 
At the same time, workable competition and its trade-off model 
produced misleading evaluations of non-standard contracts that may 
reduce non-technological transaction costs. To be precise, this 
framework led economists to interpret such agreements as market-power 
based restrictions on rivalry, restrictions that produced no offsetting 
(technological) efficiencies. For several decades, this hostility manifested 
itself as various per se rules condemning numerous non-standard 
agreements. 
More recently, so-called transaction cost economics has offered an 
alternative account of such agreements. That is, TCE contends that such 
agreements reduce the cost of relying upon atomistic markets to conduct 
economic activity. Such costs take two forms: technological transaction 
costs and non-technological transaction costs. TCE has not gone 
unheeded. Instead, courts and the enforcement agencies have relied 
upon TCE’s teachings to contract the scope of per se rules, holding that 
numerous restraints, once condemned outright as unlawful per se, should 
now be analyzed under the rule of reason. 
Nonetheless, the standard methodology for conducting rule of 
reason analysis still reflects significant influence of the partial 
equilibrium trade-off paradigm, whereby courts attempt to assess 
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whether the restraint produces harm in the form of enhanced market 
power and to compare any such harm with the benefits produced by the 
restraint. In so doing, courts and agencies treat the price or output that 
existed before the restraint as a valid baseline against which to measure 
the impact of a challenged agreement. Where there is no such baseline, 
courts perform a sort of thought experiment, asking a hypothetical 
question, namely whether price would rise (or output would fall) if the 
restraint were removed. Both baselines make perfect sense within the 
partial equilibrium framework, which assumes away the possibility of 
transaction costs, opportunism, and shifts in demand for the underlying 
product. 
TCE represents a genuine scientific revolution that undermines 
workable competition’s interpretation of non-standard contracts. One 
might therefore expect that any rule of reason test based upon this 
framework is bound to fail. In point of fact, however, the partial 
equilibrium trade-off paradigm can produce useful analyses of 
agreements that may reduce technological transaction costs, that is, the 
sort of bargaining and information costs on which Ronald Coase focused 
in his seminal work on the subject. Such costs, it turns out, are analogous 
to the sort of technological production costs normally recognized within 
workable competition and its partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm. 
Thus, application of the current method of rule of reason analysis to 
restraints that yield such benefits will produce correct results. 
Current law fares far less well when analyzing restraints that may 
reduce non-technological transaction costs. Such costs exist because of 
several departures from workable competition, departures not 
incorporated with the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm. Such 
unrecognized departures include specific investments that may enhance 
demand for the defendant’s product, the passage of time between 
investment and payoff, and the threat that these conditions will give rise 
to opportunistic behavior and, thus, externalities. These departures 
render useless the baselines that courts currently employ when 
evaluating the impact of challenged restraints. To be precise, the 
application of such baselines excludes the possibility that apparent price 
increases or reductions in output reflect the opportunism-reducing 
effects of such restraints. Such effects would naturally manifest 
themselves as increased specific investment, including investment in 
promotion, investments that could enhance demand—and thus price—
for the new product in question. While removal of the restraint could 
appear to result in reduced prices, or even higher output in some cases, 
such prices and output would reflect suboptimal specific investments 
and/or the opportunist exploitation of investments already made. 
Courts’ continued application of the trade-off paradigm to contracts 
that produce non-technological efficiencies seems puzzling at first, since 
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judges have relied upon TCE when contracting or eliminating numerous 
per se rules. Closer analysis, however, helps explain the persistence of 
this error. The trade-off paradigm has served antitrust well, solving 
problems deemed important by the antitrust community. Moreover, the 
transaction costs that Coase initially identified were readily incorporated 
within the partial equilibrium framework, given their similarity to 
technological production costs. Finally, Supreme Court decisions 
examining non-standard contracts have arisen in procedural or factual 
contexts that obscured, or obviated altogether, any conflict between TCE 
and the trade-off model. Thus, the rise of TCE has not resulted in the 
sort of crisis-generating anomalies that cause practitioners to question or 
reform a settled paradigm. 
The realization that the rule of reason analysis of restraints that 
overcome non-technological transaction costs rests upon improper 
baselines requires courts and agencies to reframe their analysis of such 
restraints so as to achieve correct results. Such reframing entails the 
selection of a new baseline against which to measure the impact of 
challenged restraints. That is, courts should select as a baseline the price 
and output that would prevail in the marketplace if the defendants 
entered the venture in question and made investments specific to that 
venture, but without the challenged restraint. In this way, tribunals can 
determine the impact of the restraint itself, while holding all other 
variables constant. Proper application of this standard can distinguish 
restraints that reduce the welfare of consumers from those that enhance 
it. 
